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Abstract 
This thesis asked whether corporate lawyers in both private practice and acting as in-
house counsel differed in their attitudes toward distinguishing their professional 
obligations concerning the provision of “business” advice.  This research establishes that 
these two groups of lawyers differ in their attitudes toward the provision of advice in two 
ways.  In connection with providing business advice, in-house counsel more frequently a) 
feel that “murky lines” exist when distinguishing between legal and business advice and, 
b) look to ethics codes.  This research reflects at its core an unresolved boundary between 
legal and business advice and provides a resolution to this issue by examining a 
philosophical approach that gives lawyers a greater opportunity to engage in practical 
reasoning.  It also establishes a framework that can be used to determine whether a 
particular business communication is categorized as legal or non-legal in nature.  
Keywords 
Legal Profession, Business Advice, Legal Advice, Legal Ethics, Rules of Professional 
Responsibility, Survey  
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Chapter 1 - Distinguishing Legal and Business Advice 
(i)  Introduction 
Business lawyers1, as a segment of the legal profession, provide legal advice to 
their clients.  This often goes beyond merely identifying the applicable law for a given 
situation since clients regularly demand that their lawyer outline the course of action they 
should take.  Oftentimes, the lawyer’s advice involves business advice.2  However, in 
practice, there is a porous boundary between “legal advice” and “business advice”, 
making it difficult to characterize the advice as either legal or business in nature.3  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For reasons explained below and in the body of this essay, “business lawyers” are also referred to as 
“corporate lawyers” herein. 
2 A survey by Vincent C. Alexander (hereinafter “Alexander”) of lawyers in New York City (concerning 
the practical effects of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context) found that 89% of lawyers 
answered ‘yes’ when asked whether they would characterize any of the advice they give to their corporate 
clients as ‘business advice’.  This study also reports that nearly four out of five corporate executives 
surveyed answered ‘yes’ to the question of whether they wanted business advice from their lawyers. See, 
V. C. Alexander, "The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants," (1988 – 1989) 63 
St. John's L. Rev. 191 - 432 (book-length empirical study, discussed further below), cited by the Supreme 
Court in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) at para. 409 (footnote 4).  There is also a 
growing consensus in the literature of a trend toward lawyers increasingly providing a form of business 
consulting service rather than traditional legal advice and litigation.  For example, there is speculation that, 
in the near future, a lawyer’s value to the client will have two dimensions: i) what she knows about a 
particular body of law and ii) what she knows about a clients’ industry or substantive concerns.  Flowing 
from this is an issue about whether lawyers have enough training and experience to understand and advise 
clients about non-legal substantive decisions.  See T.D. Morgan, “The Last Days of the American Lawyer” 
(January 27, 2010), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543301>.  This paper is based on T. D. 
Morgan’s, The Vanishing Lawyer:  The Ongoing Transformation of the U.S. Legal Profession (Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  
3 Case law makes clear that it is difficult to draw a dividing line between legal advice and business advice.  
For example see: Wong et. al v. 407527 Ontario Ltd. et. al (1999), 179 D.L.R. (4th) 38, [1999] 125 O.A.C. 
101, [1999] CanLII 3788 (ON C.A.), online: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1999/1999canlii3788/1999canlii3788.html>  (discussed further 
below) wherein Laskin J.A. stated “Although ordinarily clients retain lawyers for legal advice and not 
business advice, on some transactions the two are intermingled and no clear dividing line can be drawn.” 
Also, see Davey v. Woolley et al (1982) 35 O.R. (2d) 599, (discussed further below) wherein Wilson J.A. 
	  	  
	  
2	  
thesis explores that boundary as well as the legal profession’s responsibility concerning 
the provision of business advice. 
Certainly, the provision of a lawyer’s professional services requires competency.4  
It has even been suggested that competence is the profession’s primary ethical 
obligation.5  In 1994, the Law Society of Upper Canada (the “Law Society”) formally 
adopted a "Role Statement", which states in part that the Law Society exists to govern the 
legal profession in the public interest6 by ensuring that the people of Ontario are served 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(as she then was, later Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada) stated that “…although legal advice and 
business advice frequently coalesce in a commercial transaction of this kind, I believe that solicitors are 
generally sensitive to the distinction and view it as an important part of their responsibility to build into the 
transaction the maximum legal protection they can for their client”. 
4 See the Law Society of Upper Canada’s “Rules of Professional Conduct”, namely, rule 2.01 regarding 
"competence" to which all practicing lawyers in Ontario are subject, Rules of Professional Conduct, The 
Law Society of Upper Canada, adopted by Convocation June 22, 2000 Amendments Current to January 24, 
2013, online: http://www.lsuc.on.ca//WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147489377&langtype=1033.  
Formation of the Rules is discussed further below.  “Convocation” is the monthly meeting of Law Society 
benchers, the directors who govern the Society. The Law Society of Upper Canada is governed by a board 
of directors, who are known as “Benchers”. This board includes lawyers, paralegals and lay persons (non-
lawyers and non-paralegals). Benchers gather most months in a meeting called “Convocation” to make 
policy decisions and to deal with other matters related to the governance of Ontario's paralegals and 
lawyers. The chair of Convocation and the head of the Law Society is the “Treasurer”.  The staff and day-
to-day operations of the Law Society of Upper Canada are overseen by the chief executive officer and the 
senior management team, online: http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=673. 
 
5 Andrew Brocket in an article entitled “New Initiatives in Legal Ethics” presents competency as a duty 
owed to the public in return for a monopoly on legal services and the profession’s privilege of self-
regulation, forming a social contract.  See A. Brockett, "New Initiatives in Legal Ethics" in Westminster 
Affairs (Westminster Institute for Ethics and Human Values, London, Ontario, Winter/Spring 1993) at 17.  
However, Allice Woolley in “Imperfect Duty: Lawyers’ Obligation to Foster Access to Justice” 45(5) 
Alberta Law Review 107 (2008) shows that the legal profession has a monopoly, but individual lawyers do 
not.  
 
6 As early as 1907, in an address to the Ontario Bar Association, the Hon. Mr. Justice W.R. Riddell 
asserted that “[t]he profession of the law – using the word in the collective sense – was originated, it 
existed, and continues to exist, for the good of the public”, see W.R. Riddell, “The Lawyer” (1907) 27 Can. 
L. Times 785 at 787.   
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by lawyers who meet high standards of learning, competence and professional conduct.7  
In concrete terms, it is the mandate of the Law Society to see that persons seeking 
admission to the legal profession are competent, and to ensure that lawyers follow proper 
procedures and behave ethically.  In fact, these goals are the justification for its 
existence.8   
The Law Society has established the Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”) 
to ensure that lawyers follow proper procedures when fulfilling their professional 
services.9  These rules state that lawyers must be competent in providing legal advice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Law Society of Upper Canada’s "Role Statement", adopted by Convocation on October 27, 1994 
states in part: [The Law Society of Upper Canada exists to govern the legal profession in the public interest 
by]:   
…ensuring that the people of Ontario are served by lawyers who meet high standards of learning, 
competence and professional conduct; and upholding the independence, integrity and honour of 
the legal profession, for the purpose of advancing the cause of justice and the rule of law.   
This statement was adopted by Convocation, October 27, 1994. See The Law Society of Upper Canada, 
“The Law Society of Upper Canada Strategic Plan 2000 – 2003” (2000), at 3, online: 
<www.lsuc.on.ca/media/StrategicPlan.PDF>.  The Law Society’s commitment to competence is further 
demonstrated in the Law Society of Upper Canada’s “Joint Report to Convocation February 25, 2010”. 
This report concludes that the time has come to introduce a continuing professional development 
requirement for lawyers in Ontario. The report states that such a requirement is a necessary component of 
self-regulation and will further demonstrate the Law Society’s commitment to professional competence for 
lawyers and paralegals. Provided the model chosen is fair, transparent and reasonable the Committee 
believes that lawyers and paralegals will recognize and accept the requirement as part of their responsibility 
to the public and to their own maintenance and enhancement of competence.  See The Law Society of 
Upper Canada, “Joint Report to Convocation February 25, 2010” (2010), online: 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/news/b/reports/>.   
8 See The Law Society of Upper Canada, “The Oldest and Largest of Canadian Law Societies” (2013) 
online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=427&langtype=1033>.  
9The Law Society regulates Ontario's legal profession to ensure a competent and ethical Bar.  Legislation 
passed by the Government of Ontario, (the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8 and regulations made under 
the act) authorize the Law Society to license Ontario's lawyers and regulate their conduct, competence and 
capacity.  The Law Society’s by-laws (Made under subsections 62 (0.1) and (1) of the Law Society Act) 
and Rules of Professional Conduct (Adopted by Convocation on June 22, 2000 and in effect: November 1, 
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These rules do not specifically state whether lawyers must also be competent when they 
provide business advice.  However, in the Commentary to Rule 2.01 "Competence", 
which is set out in part below, it is noted that while a lawyer's view on non-legal matters 
such as business, policy, or social implications may be of "real benefit" to a client, the 
lawyer is obliged to clearly distinguish legal advice from other advice:10 
In addition to opinions on legal questions, the lawyer may be asked for or may be 
expected to give advice on non-legal matters such as the business, policy, or 
social implications involved in the question or the course the client should choose. 
In many instances the lawyer's experience will be such that the lawyer's views on 
non-legal matters will be of real benefit to the client. The lawyer who expresses 
views on such matters should, where and to the extent necessary, point out any 
lack of experience or other qualification in the particular field and should clearly 
distinguish legal advice from other advice.11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2000) both based in the Law Society Act - set out the professional and ethical obligations of all members of 
the profession. Members failing to meet these obligations are subject to the Society's complaints and 
discipline process. The discipline process is governed by the Rules of Practice and Procedure (applicable to 
proceedings before the Law Society Hearing Panel). 
10Thus, it is implicitly acknowledged by the very existence of this commentary that lawyers do cross the 
divide between legal and non-legal advice and hence, the question is not whether lawyers should cross the 
boundary but rather, where to draw the line.  
11 See Law Society of Upper Canada, “Rules of Professional Conduct”, Appendix A online: 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca//WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147489377&langtype=1033>. See 
commentary to Rule 2.01 “Competence”.  Generally, there is no basis for differentiating between the 
commentaries and the Rules in the disciplinary context – the commentaries can be used in the same way as 
the Rules in determining whether alleged behaviour tends to bring discredit to the legal profession. See: 
Law Society of Upper Canada v. Roy Francis Dmello, 2013 ONLSAP 0005, online: 
<http://www.canlii.org/eliisa/highlight.do?text=commentary+to+rules+of+professional+conduct&language
=en&searchTitle=Search+all+CanLII+Databases&path=/en/on/onlsap/doc/2013/2013onlsap5/2013onlsap5.
html&searchUrlHash=AAAAAQArY29tbWVudGFyeSB0byBydWxlcyBvZiBwcm9mZXNzaW9uYWwg
Y29uZHVjdAAAAAAAAAE> 
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It may be noted that neither “business” nor “business advice” is defined in the 
Rules.12  This thesis asks whether and how the distinction between business and legal 
advice is observed by practicing lawyers and to what extent judges demand such a 
distinction of them.  Whether and to what extent either lawyers or judges distinguish 
between legal and business advice necessarily involves exploration of any distinction in 
meaning between the two that is being made. Therefore, it was fundamental to this study 
that meaning not be imposed at the outset of this research.13  
Essentially, Rule 2.01 imposes two obligations on lawyers concerning advice that 
is business in nature: a) to point out lack of experience or other qualification when 
providing business advice, and b) to clearly distinguish legal advice from other advice. 
Tort law, in particular the law of negligence, is the area of law through which 
judges most frequently are called upon to help define: a) the obligations of lawyers, and 
b) what it means for a lawyer to be competent.14  As further explored in Chapter 2, recent 
case law steps beyond the Rules and the two fold duty as set out in Rule 2.01 to affirm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In Chapter 5 herein, some ordinary use definitions of “business” are set out but since there is no guidance 
about meaning provided to lawyers in the Rules, questions of the meaning understood by lawyers form part 
of the empirical enquiry that is reported in Chapters 3 and 4. 
13 Indeed, the model that comes from this study is developed to be flexible in order not to suggest those 
kinds of distinctions. Refer to Chapter 5 for further detail.  
14 J.C.P. Goldberg, “What Clients Are Owed: Cautionary Observations on Lawyers and Loss of a Chance” 
(2003) 52 Emory L. J. 1201, online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=527184.  
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that lawyers “may well have a duty to give advice on the financial or business aspects of 
a transaction” (emphasis added).15   
If lawyers have, in certain situations, a duty to provide business advice, 
presumably they are also obligated to ensure that such advice is competent.  Clearly, any 
duty to provide business advice goes beyond what is discussed in the current Rules.  
Additionally, it is an obvious problem if  legal and business advice are sometimes 
“intermingled and no clear dividing line can be drawn.”16 
Not only does litigation completed on the grounds of negligence help define the 
duties of a lawyer and what it means for a lawyer to be competent, but it also empowers a 
client whose lawyer is demonstrated to have performed incompetently to pursue and 
obtain redress.17  Thus, tort law encourages lawyers to fulfill their obligation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Wong et. al v. 407527 Ontario Ltd. et. al, supra note 3 at paragraph 46. In Wong et. al v. 407527 
Ontario Ltd. et. al, the plaintiff purchasers were looking to buy a commercial property.  The real estate 
market was “white hot”.  A real estate agent gave the purchasers a brochure on a 2-storey commercial and 
residential building, which listed a certain property.  The parties entered into an agreement of purchase and 
sale which contained a representation that the vendor would guarantee the rents of the tenants for the first 
year.  After the agreement of purchase and sale was executed, the purchasers took the agreement to their 
lawyer to close the deal.  Approximately, one year later, some tenants vacated the property; some didn’t 
pay rent; and others paid with NSF cheques.  No security was given to ensure payment of the rents and the 
purchasers lost money.  At trial, the purchaser’s lawyer was found negligent for failing to obtain security 
for the guarantee of the rents.  However, on appeal, the lawyer submitted that he had no duty to negotiate 
security for the warranty because this was a business matter, not part of a lawyer’s retainer.  The Court of 
Appeal did not accept this submission; rather the court stated that often times business and legal advice are 
intermingled and no clear dividing line can be drawn (emphasis added).  Unfortunately, no further 
guidance was provided on the issue.  Laskin J. A. did not rest his concern about the lawyer’s duty to 
negotiate security on any distinction between business advice and legal advice because he found no basis to 
attribute the purchaser’s loss to the lawyer’s failure to attempt to negotiate security for the rental income 
warranty in the first place.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Supra note 14. 
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competence because it deters lawyers from behaving carelessly.18  In this way, tort law 
has a reinforcing relationship with professional responsibility,19 and the public interest. 
In addition to compliance with the Rules and avoidance of the professional 
negligence issues discussed above, there are at least three other important reasons for 
lawyers to strive to understand the difference(s) between business and legal advice:  a) to 
understand the scope of professional liability insurance coverage, b) to maintain a proper 
solicitor-client relationship and c) for the protection of legal privilege.  
The Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (LawPRO)20 provides lawyers 
with insurance coverage for errors, omissions or negligent acts in a lawyer’s performance 
of or failure to perform “professional services” for others.  The insurance policy21 issued 
defines “professional services”22 as generally meaning: “the practice of the Law of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20The Lawyers' Professional Indemnity Company (LawPRO) provides professional liability insurance to 
lawyers in private practice in Ontario.  It was incorporated in 1990 by the Law Society of Upper Canada, 
and has operated independently of the Law Society of Upper Canada since 1995, LawPRO website: 
<http://www.lawpro.ca/AboutLawpro/default.asp>.  According to By-law 6 made under subsections 62 
(0.1) and (1) of the Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L.8, professional liability coverage through LawPRO is 
mandatory for all practicing lawyers in Ontario, see http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/bylaw06.pdf. “ 
21 See LawPRO Insurance Policy No. 2013-01, online: 
<http://www.lawpro.ca/insurance/pdf/LAWPRO_Policy2013.pdf>. 
22Supra note 21.  In the LawPRO Insurance Policy No. 2013-01, “Professional Services” means: 
 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES means the practice of the Law of Canada, its provinces and 
territories, and specifically, those services performed, or which ought to have been performed, by 
or on behalf of an INSURED in such INSURED’S capacity as a LAWYER or member of the law 
society of a RECIPROCATING JURISDICTION, subject to Part II Special Provision A; and shall 
include, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, those services for which the INSURED 
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Canada, its provinces and territories, and specifically, those services performed, or which 
ought to have been performed, by or on behalf of the insured in the insured’s capacity as 
a lawyer”.23  Whether “business advice” is included in this definition of “professional 
services” or whether it is something that “ought to have been performed… in the 
insured’s capacity as a lawyer” has important consequences with regard to the scope of 
insurance coverage.  
Secondly, in a healthy solicitor-client relationship, evidence points to the need for 
the client to be informed when his or her lawyer voices a business judgment, rather than a 
legal opinion.  This allows the client to give the lawyer’s advice the appropriate weight.24  
Similarly, in the event that legal and business advice is mixed, this should also be pointed 
out to the client so that the client can weigh the lawyer’s advice in context.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is responsible as a LAWYER arising out of such INSURED’S activity as a trustee, administrator, 
executor, arbitrator, mediator, patent or trademark agent. 
23Supra note 21.  In the LawPRO Insurance Policy No. 2013-01, “Lawyer” is defined to mean “each person 
who holds a Class L1 licence pursuant to the by-laws of the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.L.8”. 
24 See Alexander, supra note 2 at 348.  This study provides a solid empirical basis for analyzing the 
assumptions on which the law of privilege is based, albeit in an American context.  The study finds that 
solicitor-client communication is not always restricted to legal matters, and that sometimes business advice 
is sought and given.  In analyzing this finding, Alexander states that the presumption that matters referred 
to lawyers by corporate clients are prima facie for legal services is not justified in the corporate context.  
Alexander then asks whether corporate lawyers should separate business and legal advice.  In answering 
this question, he gives two reasons why the separation is appropriate: a) to allow a client to give the 
lawyer’s advice the appropriate weight and b) to prevent the loss of privilege for otherwise mixed legal and 
business communications.  See also D.N. Redlich, “Should A Lawyer Cross the Murky Divide? (Nov. 
1975) 31 Bus. Law. 478. 
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Thirdly, while legal advice is protected by solicitor client privilege,25 (this will be 
discussed further in Chapter 2) business advice is not.26   Therefore, segregation of legal 
and business advice by the lawyer is important because it may help to prevent a situation 
of lost solicitor client privilege for mixed legal and business communications that a court 
may later characterize as predominantly business in nature.27  Unfortunately, the porous 
boundary existing between business and legal advice makes it difficult to determine when 
communications between lawyers and their clients will be protected by privilege.  
Nonetheless, it appears to be is the legal profession’s responsibility to make this 
distinction.  Certainly, it would be unrealistic to expect clients to be able to distinguish 
business from legal advice; our courts can’t even do it consistently.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25See Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821 at p. 836, where Dickson, J. (as he then was) wrote: 
“Recent case law has taken the traditional doctrine of privilege and placed it on a new plane. Privilege is no 
longer regarded merely as a rule of evidence “, online: <http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1979/1980scr1-
821/1980scr1-821.html> also, for a perspective from in-house counsel, see R. Patzelt, “Solicitor & Client 
Privilege: A Brief perspective from in-house counsel” The Canadian Bar Association, online: 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/newsletters/pdf/solicitor-client.pdf>. 
26 See Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809, 2004 SCC 31, where Major 
J., (as he then was, later Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada) wrote: “like corporate lawyers who also 
may give advice in an executive or non-legal capacity, where government lawyers give policy advice 
outside the realm of their legal responsibilities, such advice is not protected by the privilege” (emphasis 
added), discussed infra in Chapter Two. 
27 Supra note 24.  Also, see K.B. Mills, “Privilege and the In-House Counsel” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 79 – 
100.  Mills states that the mixture of business and legal advice introduces uncertainty into the corporate 
environment, which, in turn, may have a negative economic effect on the corporation. He gives as an 
example that, in an increasingly competitive marketplace, the value of a corporation's information can be 
substantial, and any preventable disclosure of sensitive information could be ruinous to a business whose 
existence may depend on trade secrets. Therefore, in-house counsel's ability to advise corporate 
management properly with respect to when communications are privileged, and how this privilege may be 
maintained, is fundamental to the corporation's success.  Since corporate counsel should not expect the 
corporation or its employees to understand the differences between legal and business advice as viewed by 
the courts, it is imperative that the lawyer knows the distinction,  
28 Supra note 3. 
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This thesis explores whether and how lawyers in Ontario make the distinction 
between legal and business advice and, given this information, proposes a framework for 
decision-making, which will help them make such a distinction. 
(ii)  Structure of the Study 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  This first chapter concludes with a 
historical perspective of the role of lawyers in Canada.  It follows the development of the 
Bar’s occupational autonomy and the profession’s ethical code from the nineteenth 
century until today.29  This provides a context in which to understand the dynamics of the 
lawyer’s role within the legal services marketplace.  It is noted that in times past lawyers 
paid little attention to the distinction between “legal advice” and “business advice” but 
that recently the situation is different.  Increasingly, lawyers appear cautious in this 
regard, especially in light of their own uncertainty about what is expected of them from 
their governing body, the profession’s insurer and their clients.   
In light of chapter 1’s discussion of the historical changes regarding the provision 
of legal and business advice, Chapter 2 analyzes how judges view the obligations of 
lawyers concerning business advice, reviewing three legal perspectives.  It explores the 
current concepts of tort liability in negligence, the related requirements demanded by 
self-regulation and the law surrounding privilege.  Chapter 2 illuminates the challenges 
that make it difficult for lawyers to articulate the distinction between legal and business 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Sources examined include secondary accounts of the histories of law firms and lawyers, as well as 
primary sources including reported cases, reports of the law societies, and legislation. 
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advice.  On the other hand, one of the findings from this chapter is that the criteria in 
Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission),30 together with other elements of this 
research, form a basis for the conclusions in this thesis on how to approach clarity in 
making such a distinction. 
By the end of chapter 2, it is clear that judges, faced with the issue in court, are in 
need of assistance with regard to making a distinction between a lawyer’s legal and 
business advice.  It is also evident how infrequently judges are called upon to make 
decisions in this area.  Indeed, one focus of this study has been to express the relative 
lack of judicial decisions in this area.  It might be thought that lawyers are usually well 
able to distinguish between legal and business advice and hence, the courts do not have 
an opportunity to adjudicate many cases.  This study explores the question of whether 
that is the case by asking lawyers themselves.  The findings of the subsequent chapters in 
this thesis intimate that lawyers do need help in distinguishing between legal and 
business advice.  The focus in this thesis then, lacking clear judicial guidance, turns on 
the lawyer’s personal endeavor in making that distinction.  
  Chapter 3 explains the methodology used to survey (attached hereto as Appendix 
C) Ontario lawyers practicing in the city of Toronto in the areas of corporate or 
commercial law (hereinafter referred to as “corporate counsel”)31 for the purpose of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30Supra, note 26. 
31 The term “corporate counsel” is used throughout this thesis to identify lawyers who self-identify as 
practicing in any or all of the following areas: business, corporate and commercial. The usage of the term is 
not intended to imply that such a lawyer’s practice is restricted to advising businesses operating through a 
corporate form. 
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determining how lawyers distinguish business from legal advice.  The survey includes 
both lawyers in private practice and those working in-house.  The data were collected in 
response to the challenges outlined in chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the data analysis. The fundamental goals driving 
the collection of the data were to develop a base of knowledge about lawyers’ 
understanding and perception of the distinction between legal and business advice and to 
determine if the current perceptions and understandings of lawyers are consistent with the 
basic goals and principles of the legal profession’s articulated approach to distinguishing 
between legal and business advice.  
The survey showed that other than with regard to opining on whether “murky 
lines” exist when distinguishing between legal and business advice, and where lawyers 
have assistance in making such distinctions, there are no significant differences in 
attitudes about these issues arising between lawyers in private practice and those 
practicing in-house.   More in-house counsel than lawyers in private practice feel that 
“murky lines” exist when distinguishing between legal and business advice.  More in-
house counsel look to ethics codes in connection with providing business advice.  But in 
matters such as: whether they have difficulty distinguishing between legal and business 
advice, whether they have a duty to provide business advice, what experience they rely 
upon when providing such advice, what compels and restricts them from providing 
advice, and how they conceive of business advice, all lawyers take the same approaches.  
This is explained further in Chapter 4.  
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It is evident from the results of the survey that, for all lawyers, there is some 
tension between how they report the ease of making the distinction between legal and 
business advice and how they report their clarity in making that distinction.32    
Accordingly, it appears that lawyers would benefit from having a foundation for making 
necessary distinctions but that such a foundation is lacking.  This provides the 
background for the final aspect of this research. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis explores the possibility of the potential for merging theory 
and practice.  It begins by describing the work of John Finnis, a noted legal philosopher, 
and explores whether this body of work may have potential, when taken together with the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s test in Pritchard (mentioned above and explained more fully 
in Chapter 2), for providing the foundation for lawyers’ ethical decision making in this 
area.  The chapter explains that the fact that there is no prescription available for 
reconciling any difference between business and legal advice may in fact be appropriate 
to the exercise of ethical decision-making.33  Subsequent to establishing that Finnis’ work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For example, as further discussed below in Chapter 4, three quarters of all in-house respondents report 
that they do not find it difficult to distinguish between legal and business advice (Question 8 of the survey) 
but an almost equal number report that they find murky lines exist when distinguishing between legal and 
business advice (Question 11 of the survey).  Both in-house respondents and those in private practice 
reported that they did not have a duty to provide business advice but they also reported a number of 
circumstances in which they do provide business advice.  Tension surrounds an apparent incongruence, 
namely that lawyers deny that there is a duty to provide business advice and yet offer a number of 
circumstances in which they do provide such advice.  Lawyers in this circumstance, who find they are 
providing such advice, need to understand whether they are making such a distinction for their own 
purposes, to comply with the Rules, or to understand the scope of their insurance coverage (this is 
discussed further in Chapter 4). 
33 In addition to scholarly argument that ethical rules can impede moral development, there is also evidence 
suggesting that ethical codes actually inhibit ethical deliberation by those lawyers who do refer to them for 
assistance in solving specific problems. For evidence that ethical codes actually inhibit ethical deliberation, 
see Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, “Do Codes of Ethics Actually Shape Legal 
Practice” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 645 at p.647 [Wilkinson, “Codes of Ethics”]. 
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has this potential, Chapter 5 concludes this study with an articulation of this author’s 
three-step test which (a) satisfies the test in Pritchard, (b) accords with Finnis’ theories 
and (c) would appear to meet the needs of the practicing lawyers surveyed in this study.  
 
(iii)  Background to the question of distinguishing legal and business advice: the 
development of the “corporate law firm” 
This historical perspective of the role of lawyers in Canada interweaves three 
developments that have led to the present research question: a) organization of the 
corporate firm,34 b) the Bar’s occupational autonomy and c) the profession’s ethical code.  
The discussion provides an outline of how lawyers’ roles have changed over time and 
provides a context in which to understand the dynamics of these roles and where the 
profession finds itself today.  
Carol Wilton broadly outlines how changing economic and social circumstances 
have given rise to the development of five types of law-firm organizations in Canada.  
During the golden age of the sole practitioner (1820-80), the profession was dominated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The language used within this chapter surrounding the phrase “corporate firm” concerns the development 
of the “corporate” firm’s organization. Indeed, among the first organizations that needed legal advice 
during the early evolution of law firms, were business organizations. However, concomitant with the 
evolution of the law firm was a confusion surrounding the differences between sole proprietorships, 
corporations and partnerships.  Accordingly, what is referred to in this thesis as “corporate” is linked to the 
entity of a corporation, but is not meant to exclusive to the corporate form.  For example, while the 
corporation emerges to dominate the business environment, the vestige of this nomenclature remains and 
today it is dominantly used within the business environment. Please note that in this thesis, the term 
embraces all forms of business ownership, including the not-for-profit structure, which has begun to 
embrace a business persona. 
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by small firms comprising one to three lawyers involved in general practice.35  The age of 
industrial and finance capitalism (1880-1919) produced larger firms of five or more 
lawyers doing at least some corporate work.36  The interwar years (1919-1939) saw the 
emergence of the corporate firm with ten to twenty lawyers focusing primarily on 
corporate office practice.37  Prosperity and the expanded role of government during the 
two generations after the start of the Second World War (1939-73) contributed to the rise 
of “giant” corporate firms employing fifty or more lawyers.38  Developments since the 
early 1970s have given rise to the advent of corporate “mega-firms” of one hundred or 
more lawyers.39   
As law firms started growing, lawyers in Ontario were concurrently trying to 
establish, formalize and justify the Bar’s occupational autonomy.40  The Law Society of 
Upper Canada, the largest of all Canadian law societies, was founded in 1797, almost 20 
years before the earliest such association in any other province or territory.41  Curtis Cole, 
in his Ph.D. dissertation entitled,  "A Learned and Honourable Body” The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 C. Wilton, ed. Essays in the History of Canadian Law vol. 7 Inside the Law: Canadian Law Firms in 
Historical Perspective (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1996) at 5-11. 
36 Ibid, pp. 5 and 11-26 
37 Ibid, pp. 5 and 18-26 
38 Ibid, pp. 5 and 26-34. 
39 Ibid, pp. 5 and 34-42. 
40 Curtis Cole, “A Learned and Honorable Body: The Professionalization of the Ontario Bar, 1867-1929” 
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1987). 
41 The Law Society of Upper Canada, History, The Oldest and Largest of Canadian Law Societies, supra 
note: 8. 
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Professionalization of the Ontario Bar, 1867-1929, analyzes four specific ways in which 
Ontario lawyers sought to establish and entrench the Bar’s indigenous control over the 
practice of law.  Briefly, the Bar first made a series of concerted attempts to establish a 
monopoly over the supply of legal services.42  Secondly, it made a program of classroom 
instruction in law mandatory for all law students, and it maintained control over all 
aspects of legal education.43  Thirdly, it succeeded in transferring the authority to 
maintain professional discipline among lawyers from the courts to its own corporate 
body, the Law Society of Upper Canada.  Finally, in addition to the lawyers’ own 
governing body, the Law Society of Upper Canada, the members of the Bar established a 
network of professional organizations.  One of these professional organizations was the 
Ontario Bar Association.  The Ontario Bar Association is a branch of the Canadian Bar 
Association, which early in the twentieth century Canada, first moved towards the 
adoption of a “Code of Professional Ethics”.44 
In “Becoming ‘Ethical’: Lawyers’ Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth Century 
Canada”, Wesley Pue sketches out the contours of a debate amongst eminent lawyers at 
the time that the first ethics code was adopted by the Canadian Bar Association as to the 
desirability of adopting any such code at all.45  Pue states that while today it seems to be a 
matter of common sense that the legal profession should generate, publicize and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 W. Pue "Becoming `Ethical': Lawyers' Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth Century Canada" (1991) 
20 Manitoba Law Journal, 227-261, online: <	  http://faculty.law.ubc.ca/Pue/pdf/Becoming%20Ethical.pdf>. 
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ultimately enforce standards of ethical conduct, it was not always so.46  According to Pue, 
the idea that any professional body should presume to dictate to individual practitioners 
how they should go about their business is of recent vintage.47   
 
Pue points out that it is important to understand that certain features relating to the 
organization and structure of the Canadian legal profession in the first quarter of the 
twentieth Century produced lawyer’s self-conceptions distinct from those that now 
prevail.48  The legal profession of that period differed in at least four essential respects 
from the form that we take for granted today.49  Firstly, the idea of national professional 
organization was novel then: the Canadian Bar Association had only become successfully 
established in 1915.50  Secondly, provincial law societies generally lacked the powers 
now assumed to be essential to self-governance (and, hence, lacked the sine qua non of 
modern “professionalism”).51  Indeed, it has only been in the last eighty or ninety years 
that full privileges of self-governance have been conferred upon law societies by the 
various provincial governments.52  The powers in all cases of Canadian professional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid at 240. 
48 Supra note 45. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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organizations originated in “statute instead of by prescriptive right”.53  Thirdly, in the 
early twentieth century the forms of professional education and qualification were 
relatively loose, varying widely from province to province.  Finally, the idea of a unified 
profession had not yet fully taken hold.54  The formal distinctions between barrister and 
solicitor mattered in the common law provinces, just as that between avocat and notaire 
mattered (and matters) in Quebec.55  
As has been mentioned above, it was the end of the nineteenth century and 
beginning of the twentieth century, an age of industrial and finance capitalism, which 
witnessed the rise of the corporate lawyer and the very beginning of the so-called 
corporate law firm in Canada.56  This rise was rapid.  In Canada, corporate lawyers and 
their firms quickly gained prominence in the business life of the country.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Supra note 35 at p.11. For a general history of the Law Society of Upper Canada, supra note 8. 
54 Pue, supra note 45 
55 Ibid. Canadian lawyers were, after the Great War, acutely aware that “the legal profession in Canada is 
made up of two distinct professions, with different duties, different responsibilities and liabilities, different 
history and traditions and subject to different rules.” While most lawyers across the country chose to be 
admitted to both branches of the legal profession simultaneously this was not necessarily the case.  (see 
C.J.M. Mathers, Legal Ethics (Address to the Manitoba Bar Association, 19 May 1920) [Archive of 
Western Canadian Legal History, Acc. No. 49.A222] at 5.  This paper was also presented at the 1920 
meeting of the Canadian Bar Association: (1920) 5 Proceedings of the Can. Bar Assn., 268 at 26. 
56 A “corporate lawyer” addresses the practical concerns of his or her clients through the application of 
legal ideas and precedents.  They specialize in matters affecting the creation, operation or dissolution of an 
organization, including those of a legal corporation.  Most corporate lawyers work within the legal 
department of a business or as part of a corporate law firm. Some specialize in specific areas of business 
like corporate structure, governance, finance, taxation, insurance, real estate transactions or mergers and 
acquisitions. Other corporate law sub-specialties include contract drafting and review, legal research and 
government regulation – also see Marchildon’s first footnote in G.P. Marchildon, “Corporate Lawyers and 
the Second Industrial Revolution in Canada” (2001) Saskatchewan Law Review 64(1): 99-112. 
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As in the United States, in Canada these lawyers and their firms were involved in 
creating, promoting, and financing the large corporate enterprises that would soon 
dominate the business landscape of the country.57 
Throughout the centuries, lawyers had dealt with, and profited from, the 
transaction costs of the marketplace.  During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
however, the costs of negotiating contracts and the elaborate precautions taken to ensure 
compliance with their terms had become an increasing part of the services provided by 
lawyers.58  In reducing contractual terms to writing that required clear title to the property 
being transferred, the proper quantity and quality of goods and their timely delivery, and 
the adequate performance of services, lawyers supplied a facilitating role for business.59  
They also assisted by obtaining judicial remedies for non-performance of contracts – or 
resisting claims to such remedies on behalf of their clients.   But the real change came 
with the rise of big business during the “second industrial revolution” especially between 
1909-1912.  During this time the function of most lawyers changed little; in contrast, the 
role of the few lawyers who chose either to specialize in facilitating the promoters and 
financiers or who concentrated on servicing newly incorporated enterprises changed 
dramatically.60   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid. 
58 Supra note 56 at 102. 
59 Supra note 56 
60 G.P. Marchildon, “The Role of Lawyers in Corporate Promotion and Management: A Canadian Case 
Study and Theoretical Speculations” (1990) Business and Economic History, 2d ser. 19 at 193-202. 
	  	  
	  
20	  
Marchildon examines some of the historical reasons for the very direct role that 
Canadian corporate lawyers played during the early twentieth century.  He provides two 
principal reasons for their prominence.   The first is that lawyers acted as a bridge 
between the world of the small business owner-operator and the new hierarchy of 
professional corporate managers that was only beginning to emerge during what he refers 
to as the “Laurier boom” (marking the period when Canadian industry and resource 
development surged ahead during Wilfred Laurier’s years in power as the Prime Minister 
of Canada between July 11, 1896 –October 6, 1911).  The rise of the corporate economy, 
with its new technologies, its new organizational strutures and its need for new methods 
of security financing, required very different skills than those possessed by then existing 
business managers.  With their newly acquired knowledge of the legal needs of the new 
enterprises, the more innovative and sophisticated lawyers could, and did, fill the 
temporary gap.  The second reason is that lawyers, particularly those trained in the few 
law schools of the time, had a definite educational advantage relative to their business 
contemporaries.  With their broader educational background, many lawyers were quick 
studies when it came to understanding and assimilating the rapid industrial, 
organizational, and financial changes taking place throughout.61 
 
Marchildon has noted that corporate lawyers not only rose to the pinnacle of the 
legal profession in the twentieth century (as measured by income and status), they also 
became prominent members of the Canadian elite.  John Porter also demonstrates this in 
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his analyses of class and power in the 1950s and 1960s.62  However, paradoxically, even 
as their status and economic position was becoming entrenched, corporate lawyers were 
beginning to move away from direct involvement in the world of business.  Since the 
years of the “Laurier boom”, law and business have become increasingly distinct spheres 
of activity.  In other words, as servicing the needs of corporations became an increasingly 
significant and specialized part of the legal world, the previously direct role of lawyers in 
that world shrunk.63  
 
Marchildon states that there are perhaps both demand and supply reasons for this 
development.  The demand for lawyers to play a direct role in business diminished once a 
large core of professional corporate managers and investment bankers emerged.  
Moreover, given the overall increase in educational levels in the Canadian population, 
and with the introduction of new professional programs (including MBA programs 
following the Second World War, for example), lawyers no longer had a clear 
educational advantage.  Marchildon speculates that lawyers themselves increasingly came 
to see business arrangements with clients as detrimental to the professional obligation of 
lawyers to provide objective legal advice to those same clients.  He asserts that firms that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See J. Porter, “The Concentration of Economic Power and the Economic Elite in Canada” (1956) 22 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 199; J. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of 
Social Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).  
63 Supra note 56 at 111. 
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continued their earlier “Laurier boom” practice of direct participation in business began 
to be looked down on by other firms.64  
 
Another viable explanation for lawyers’ diminishing role in the direct conduct of 
their clients’ businesses is that the economic organization of the legal profession moved 
from a club system during the 1950s-1980s, to a competitive system starting from the 
1990s and continuing today.  Geoffrey Miller in From Club to Market: The Evolving 
Role of Business Lawyers notes that the unusual macroeconomic environment of the mid 
and late 1990s, exemplified by the stock market bubble, which peaked at the beginning of 
this twenty-first century, may have contributed to this development.65  Furthermore, he 
also notes that a number of changes in the conditions of corporate practice may have 
collectively contributed to a more competitive environment.66  Such changes in 
conditions of corporate practice today compared to that of the 1950s are as follows:  
 
• Barriers to entry to the profession have become less significant and an 
increase in the supply of lawyers may have translated into enhanced 
competition at the Bar;  
• Non-lawyers, multidisciplinary practices and computers are performing tasks 
previously monopolized by lawyers;  
• Demographic changes have occurred in the profession; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Marchildon acknowledges that these last conclusions may be little more than supposition. See 
Marchildon’s footnote 47 in “Corporate Lawyers and the Second Industrial Revolution” supra note 56.  
65 G.P. Miller, “From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers” (2006) Fordham Law 
Review, NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-22, online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=841466. 
66 Ibid.  Note: this is an American Perspective. 
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• Restraints on mobility are less binding, and there is an increased client 
portability; 
• The loyalty between law firms and their longstanding clients has eroded;  
• Developments in clients’ industries have, in and of themselves, have made 
industries more competitive; 
• Law firm demographics and compensation systems have changed; and 
• Costs for lawyers (data processing, storage and retrieval) have increased. 
 
These circumstances have created a competitive legal market.  The current trends of 
contracting out legal work and disaggregating legal services by outsourcing legal work 
will further contribute to the competitive environment. 67  
Further, these circumstances that contribute to the current environment in which 
lawyers find themselves practicing also affect the nature of ethical issues that face those 
practicing in such an environment.  For example, with regard to competition between 
providers of legal services (which increases the bargaining power of clients vis-a-vis their 
lawyers), could this be a threat to the lawyer’s independence because of the potential 
exercise of excessive influence over the lawyer or the lawyer’s excessive reliance on the 
revenue from a given client?  Is there a lack of objectivity because of fear of losing a 
client?  Does this create a problem?  As just discussed, it is far from clear that 
professional autonomy was a notable feature of the practice of corporate law to begin 
with,68 but it has become a concern in the present and it is therefore important to 
understand the profession’s responsibility particularly as it relates to practising corporate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Supra note 65 at 49. 
68 Supra note 35 at 42. 
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law now and the ethical requirements required as a consequence thereof.  This research 
therefore, focusses exclusively on corporate lawyers. 
Although lawyers’ involvement in the direct busiess activities fo their clients 
diminished in the twentieth centure, as just discussed, practicing in today’s competitive 
environment may be a catalyst for corporate lawyers to start acting again in more of a 
business-advisory role.  In fact, this appears to be happening with in-house counsel.  For 
example, in 2006, The Lawyers Weekly reported that the role of in-house counsel has 
greatly expanded beyond that of simply providing legal advice.  The Lawyers Weekly 
reported that a survey conducted by the Canadian Corporate Counsel Association and the 
law firm of Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP found that the majority of in-house 
counsel do not feel that a “legal role” is the most important one they play within their 
organization.  In fact, almost half felt that an “advisory role” was the most important, and 
one-third felt a “management role” was paramount.  Only twenty-one percent (21%) 
ranked a “legal role” as the most prominent.69 
This is something that was empirically tested through the survey that was 
administered as part of this research.  The results of the survey are reported and analyzed 
in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
The survey by Vincent C. Alexander of lawyers in New York City (concerning 
the practical effects of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context) found that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 J. Allen, “Corporate Counsel: The Hybrid Generation” (2006) The Lawyers Weekly, available online: 
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89% of lawyers answered ‘yes’ when asked whether they would characterize any of the 
advice they give to their corporate clients as ‘business advice’.70  Alexander’s study also 
reported that nearly four out of five corporate executives surveyed answered ‘yes’ to the 
question of whether they wanted business advice from their lawyers. However, whereas 
Alexander’s survey seemed to have assumed that business advice is not legal advice, as 
outlined above, this research explored whether that very question: whether business 
advice can be legal advice, at least in certain cases. 
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Chapter 2 – The Courts and the Obligations of Lawyers 
 
The history of the development of the legal profession in Canada has been 
discussed.  Now, the type of advice that lawyers are currently obliged to provide will be 
explored. There remains uncertainty surrounding the questions of whether or not a lawyer 
is obliged to provide non-legal business advice and if so, what the ramifications of that 
are. 
Generally speaking, there are four general sources of duties in law under which 
lawyers derive obligations to their clients.  These are: i) contractual duties, ii) duties in 
tort, iii) fiduciary duties, and iv) ethical codes.  The duties derived from fiduciary 
obligation are generally not related to this research and hence are given a very limited 
discussion below in connection with privilege. 
(i)  The Contractual Duties of Lawyers to their Clients  
The most obvious source of a lawyer’s duty to the client is the retainer.  
Preferably, it is written.  However, it may be oral, or it may be inferred from the conduct 
of the parties.  A sample clause in a sample retainer from LawPRO is as follows: 
Dear Shoe Company 
Re: Selling shoes in Canada and the USA 
In accordance with our meeting of April 14, 2012 we have agreed to 
represent you in connection with your commencing operations as a shoe 
distribution business in Ontario. 
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You also informed us that you have a problem concerning collection of 
accounts receivable from XYZ Inc. but we are not representing you with 
respect to that problem.71 
Looking at this model retainer raises a number of questions: 
• Is opening a bank account within the scope of the retainer? Advising on which 
bank to use, which Merchant service provider?   
• Is advising on an additional authorized signatory within the scope of the 
retainer? 
• Is filing out the agency agreement for customs brokers within the scope? 
Thus, it can be seen that even though a lawyer has the opportunity to initially define the 
terms of the retainer as specifically as the lawyer wants, there is still potential for 
ambiguity in acting under the retainer in terms of such issues as whether and to what 
extent the lawyer has been hired to provide non-legal business advice.  To that extent this 
sample retainer would unclear. 
 
(ii)  The Lawyer’s Potential Tort Liability in Negligence 
A lawyer’s obligation to the client also derives from tort law.  Relatively few 
Canadian cases bear upon the various factors that come into play when one attempts to 
ascertain the extent of the lawyer’s obligation to a client under tort law.  
1979 Case - Enola Apartments Ltd. v. Young,72 from below 
1982 Case - Brumer v. Gunn,73 from below 
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  Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, “Short Retainer” online: <	  
http://www.practicepro.ca/practice/PDF/retainer_letter_general_short.pdf>. 
72	  Enola Apartments Ltd. v. Young (1979), 30 R.P.R. 94 (Ont. H.C.J.), 
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1986 Case - Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse,74 from below 
1999 Case - Wong v. 407527 Ontario Limited,75 from below 
2003 Case - Palmieri v. Misir,76 from below 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada spoke to this area in 1986.  In Central Trust Co. v. 
Rafuse77, lawyers were retained to provide an opinion to Central Trust on the validity of a 
mortgage that was the security for a large advance of funds.  The mortgage was held to be 
void for its failure to comply with certain provisions of the Nova Scotia Companies Act, 
resulting in Central Trust’s security being worthless. Central Trust therefore, sued its 
lawyers on the transaction, Jack P. Rafuse and Franklyn W. Cordon. 
Mr. Justice Le Dain, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, held that: (1) the 
common law duty of care is created by a “sufficient relationship of proximity” and is not 
confined to relationships that arise apart from contract; and (2) the duty of care thus 
created is independent of contract in that it is not founded on the specific obligations or 
duties established by the express terms of the contract.  Thus the lawyers owed their 
client a duty beyond the confine of the retainer (the contract) and were liable in 
negligence to their client. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Brumer v. Gunn (1982), 18 Man.R. (2d) 155 (Q.B.).	  
74	  Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147, 75 N.S.R. (2d) 109.	  
75	  Wong v. 407527 Ontario Limited (1999), 179 D.L.R. (4th) 38, 125 O.A.C. 101 (Ont. C.A.).	  
76	  Palmieri v. Misir [2003] O.J. No. 3518.	  
77 Supra note 74. 
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The later case of Wong v. 407527 Ontario Limited78 concerned a lawyer (Hui), 
who did not obtain security for a guarantee. On appeal, Hui’s law firm argued that advice 
regarding negotiating security was “business advice”, and hence, they were not required 
to provide it to their client, 407527 Ontario Limited.  In response, Laskin J.A. (son of the 
former Chief Justice of Canada) said on behalf of the Court:  
I do not, however, rest my concern about Hui’s duty to negotiate security on any 
distinction between business advice and legal advice.  Hui submitted that he had 
no duty to negotiate security for the warranty because this was a business matter, 
not part of a lawyer’s retainer.  I do not accept this submission.  Although 
ordinarily clients retain lawyers for legal advice not business advice, on some 
transactions the two are intermingled and no clear dividing line can be drawn.79 
In Enola Apartments Ltd. v. Young80 the lawyer had knowledge of the previous 
selling price of a property but did not disclose this to his client, who was then purchasing 
the same property.  The client found out and sued the lawyer.  The essence of the claim 
against the defendant, Young, was that he was negligent as a lawyer. Specifically, it was 
claimed that he failed in his duty to the client, the plaintiff in this action, for failing to 
disclose that a sale of the property involved had occurred some months previously in the 
amount of $56,500.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Supra note 75. 
79	  Ibid. This appeal concerned the liability of a real estate agent and a lawyer and the lawyer’s law firm for 
failing to negotiate for their clients, the purchasers of a commercial building.  The commercial building was 
intended to provide security for a warranty on rental income given by the vendor, a numbered Ontario 
company. The real estate agent drafted the agreement of purchase and sale.  After the agreement was signed 
the lawyer, Henry Hui, was retained to close the transaction.  The trial judge found the real estate agent and 
his employer, as well as the lawyer, Hui, and his law firm Hui, Hune & Wong liable in negligence.  With 
regard to the law firm, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the law firm and dismissed the action 
against such firm.  
80 Supra note 72. 
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In the case before him, Justice Reid dismissed the claim for negligence in part 
based on his finding that the client was a reasonably sophisticated investor.  He found 
that there was no obligation on the solicitor to investigate or advise the client as to the 
value of the property in question. 
But, he stated that the result would have been different if: “[the lawyer] were 
aware that the client were relying on him to advise on the value of the investment, that is 
to advise whether the investment was a prudent or imprudent one or a good or bad one, 
then that would, in my opinion, set up a duty in him without any explicit request from the 
client to consider the client’s financial interest.” 
Again in the nearly contemporary case of Brumer v. Gunn,81 the business 
sophistication of the client mattered.  In this case, the lawyer (Gunn) was found negligent 
for advising an unsophisticated elderly woman (Brumer) to invest all her money in 
speculative loans.   
In this case, Justice Morse said:  “I have no doubt that, in the circumstances of 
this case, the defendant, in tendering investment advice to the plaintiff and in arranging 
for the investment of her money in a specific venture, namely, in loans to Chariot Cycle, 
was acting in his professional capacity as a solicitor”.82  
Justice Morse further quoted  
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  Supra note 73. 
82 Ibid. 
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... If, however, money is left with the solicitor for an investment in a specific 
venture, then the solicitor accepts such money in his professional capacity in the 
course of his duties as practicing solicitor. Today the range of services performed 
by practicing solicitors are much wider, and therefore the practice of the legal 
profession now is much more diversified than it was 100 years ago. Practicing 
solicitors now give advice on such subjects as business opportunities, investment 
opportunities, tax shelters and other similar commercial matters. To hold that the 
modern practice of law does not include the services in business or investment 
fields is to close one's eyes to the realities of this era.83 
 
These few cases establish that the obligation of a lawyer to consider and advise on 
a client’s business interests, as well as legal interests, depends largely on the nature of the 
relationship between the lawyer and the client including, (i) the degree to which the client 
reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide business advice, and (ii) the sophistication of 
the client in business matters. Both are relevant factors in ascertaining the extent of the 
lawyer’s obligation.   
As mentioned earlier, it is required of lawyers practicing in Ontario that they be 
insured against negligence.84    
The Lawyers Professional Indemnity Company (the company which provides this 
insurance, “LawPro”) has had occasion to become involved in the question of whether 
lawyers may have a duty to provide business advice arising from the tort obligations that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Ibid. 
84 Lawyers practicing in Canada are not insured against the requirements flowing from self-regulation, or 
privilege.  
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were just discussed.  In Palmieri v. Misir,85 a lawyer (Misir) was retained to provide legal 
services and invest money for his client (Palmieri).  Misir made some bad investments 
with Palmieri’s money, lost $5 million and was sued by his client.  LawPro, under whom 
Misir was insured, as required of lawyers, wanted to get out defending Misir and relied 
on the definition of “professional services” in the policy between Misir and LawPro to 
say the dispute with Palmieri did not involve professional services provided by Misir and 
therefore LawPro was not obliged to become involved.  But the Court held that it was not 
reasonable for LawPro to conclude at such an early stage that the plaintiffs’ claim did not 
arise out of the professional services that Misir was required to perform.  In other words, 
the Court recognized that the lawyer’s professional services may have involved providing 
investment (business) advice.  
 
(iii)  The Requirements of Self-Regulation 
In 1978, the Law Society of Upper Canada raised calls for lawyers to be 
scrupulous in distinguishing between legal advice and non-legal advice to an ethical 
duty.86  The rule was first placed in the commentary to Rule 3 of the Professional 
Conduct Handbook. Rule 3 concerned “Advising clients” and stated, “The lawyer must 
be both honest and candid when advising clients.”  At present, the requirement to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Supra note 76. 
86 Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook (Toronto: LSUC, 1978). 
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distinguish legal advice from non-legal advice is placed in the commentary to Rule 2.  
Rule 2 concerns “Relationship to Clients”.  
Essentially, this rule imposes two obligations on lawyers concerning advice that is 
business in nature:  
• to point out lack of experience or other qualification when providing non-
legal advice, and  
• to clearly distinguish legal advice from other advice. 
In the commentary to “Advising Clients” in Rule 3 of the Handbook, which rule 
stated “The lawyer must be both honest and candid when advising clients.”87  The 
commentary was couched under a rule regarding honesty in advising clients and read as 
follows: 
In addition to opinions on legal questions, the lawyer may be asked for or 
may be expected to give advice on non-legal matters such as the business, 
policy, or social implications involved in the question or the course the 
client should choose. In many instances the lawyer's experience will be 
such that the lawyer's views on non-legal matters will be of real benefit to 
the client. The lawyer who expresses views on such matters should, where 
and to the extent necessary, point out any lack of experience or other 
qualification in the particular field and should clearly distinguish legal 
advice from other advice.88 
 
Nevertheless it seems that, presently, the requirement to distinguish legal advice 
from non-legal advice is based upon the need for competence.  The relevant commentary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Ibid. 
88	  Ibid. 
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on non-legal matters is now couched in Rule 2.01 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
(attached hereto as Appendix A).89  Rule 2 defines “competent lawyer” and includes rules 
and commentaries on client-related issues such as lawyer competence, conflicts of 
interest and confidentiality under the broad heading of “Relationship to Clients”. Indeed, 
competence is the Law Society’s primary ethical endeavor.  
When the commentary to the Rules was first included in 1978, reference was 
made to an epitome from Johnstone & Hopson,90 which stated that often legal and non-
legal issues are intertwined and that the role of the lawyer for a particular client may lead 
a lawyer to spot problems of which the client is unaware and call them to the client’s 
attention.  Intuitively this relates to “recognizing limitations in one's ability to handle a 
matter or some aspect of it, and taking steps accordingly to ensure the client is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Available online: 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca//WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147489377&langtype=1033.  
90 See Smith, B.G. Professional Conduct for Canadian Lawyers, 1989 Butterworths Canada Ltd.  The 
following is quoted from Johnstone & Hopson, Lawyers and Their Work (1967), Bobbs-Merill, 
Indianapolis (a U.K.-U.S. comparison), pp. 78-81:   
The lawyer’s advice is usually largely based on his conception of relevant legal doctrine and its 
bearing on the particular factual situation at hand.  Anticipated reactions of courts, probative value 
of evidence, desires and resources of clients, and alternative courses of action are likely to have 
been considered and referred to.  He may indicate his preference and argue persuasively, or pose 
available alternatives in neutral terms.  He makes the law and legal processes meaningful to 
clients; he explains legal doctrine and practices and their implications; he interprets both doctrine 
and impact.  Often legal and non-legal issues are intertwined.  Much turns on whether the client 
wants a servant, a critic, a sounding board, a neutral evaluator of ideas, reassurance, authority to 
strengthen his hand. . . The real problem may be one, not of role conflict, but of role definition.  
The lawyer may spot problems of which the client is unaware and call them to his attention.  
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appropriately served”, which is but one aspect of the inclusive nature of the definition of 
competence.91 
Consequently, Ontario lawyers have an ethical duty to distinguish legal from 
“other” advice, but it may be recalled in Wong v. 407527 Ontario Limited92, the Court of 
Appeal stated that often times business and legal advice are intermingled and no clear 
dividing line can be drawn.  Is it possible then, to follow the Law Society rule and to 
distinguish legal from non-legal advice and point out a lack of qualification for non-legal 
advice – thus satisfying the lawyer’s professional regulatory requirement - and still be 
liable in negligence?   
Recall that in Brumer v. Gunn93, the lawyer was found negligent for advising an 
unsophisticated elderly woman to invest all her money in a bad investment.  If the lawyer 
in that case had complied with the Law Society’s rules by a) pointing out his lack of 
experience or other qualification, and b) clearly distinguishing the legal advice from the 
other advice, would he still have been held liable in negligence?  It seems that he likely 
would because of the lack of sophistication of the client and the client’s reliance upon the 
lawyer for sound advice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Supra note 89, at rule 2.01 “competence”. 
92	  Supra note 75. 
93	  Supra note 73. 
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 (iv) Solicitor-Client Privilege 
Examination of contract, tort and regulatory requirements indicates that there 
remains uncertainty surrounding questions of whether or not a lawyer is obliged to 
provide non-legal business advice to clients and if there is such an obligation, or such 
advice is given although not and obligation, what the ramifications of that are.  The law 
of contract does not always apply, depending upon the terms of the retainer in issue.  The 
case law on negligence is unhelpful because it is conflicting.  And while admittedly, the 
Law Society’s Rules do not appear to be internally conflicting, they require a lawyer to 
make a distinction between legal and non-legal advice without providing any guidance on 
how to undertake such a task.  The law surrounding solicitor-client privilege, on the other 
hand, further emphasizes the importance and implications of making a distinction 
between legal and business advice but does attempt to make the distinction clear.  
However, as will be demonstrated, this area also needs further development and 
clarification in law. 
Solicitor-client privilege protects communications between a lawyer and client 
from being disclosed without the permission of the client.  The privilege is that of the 
client and not that of the lawyer.  The privilege is rooted in that fundamental necessity of 
full and frank communication between lawyer and client, which is necessary for the 
administration of justice.  
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In Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd.,94 a case that dealt with privilege 
regarding in-house counsel communications, Lord Denning accepted that the same rules 
of privilege apply to in-house counsel, but that only communications made in the 
capacity of legal advisor are privileged, and not work done in any other capacity.  Lord 
Denning, in his comments in the Alfred Crompton95 case, also points out the importance 
of distinguishing legal from non-legal advice: 
It does sometimes happen that such a legal adviser does work for his employer in 
another capacity, perhaps of an executive nature.  Their communications in that capacity 
would not be the subject of legal professional privilege.  So the legal adviser must be 
scrupulous to make the distinction.96 
Lord Denning is referring here to what we consider today as in-house counsel.  
However, the statement has broad application to corporate lawyers in private practice that 
also perform non-legal services.  Thus Lord Denning warned that in-house counsel “must 
be scrupulous to make this distinction”. 
To very briefly summarize privilege, without going through all the caselaw in 
detail, legal advice is protected by solicitor client privilege,97 while generally business 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd. [1972] 2 All E.R. 353 at p.376 (C.A.), affirmed on other 
grounds [1972] 2 All E.R. 1169 (H.L.), per Lord Denning. 
95 Ibid. 
96	  Ibid. 
97See Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821 at p. 836, where Dickson, J. (later Chief Justice) wrote: 
“Recent case law has taken the traditional doctrine of privilege and placed it on a new plane. Privilege is no 
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advice is not.98  Therefore, identifying legal and business advice by the lawyer and 
notifying the client is important because it will identify the loss of solicitor client 
privilege for the business advice to the client.  
Under the Rules, as discussed above, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to make this 
distinction between legal and business advice.  Certainly, it would be unrealistic to expect 
clients to be able to distinguish business from legal advice; as has been shown, the courts 
can’t even do it consistently.99   
Notifying a client of whether or not a communication is privileged or not may be 
a requirement relating to the lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the client. Lac Minerals Ltd. v. 
International Corona Resources Ltd.  [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 and Hodginson v. Simms 
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 377 help to identify when such “fiduciary obligations” may arise.  These 
two cases suggest that where a relationship has, as its essence, discretion, influence over 
interests, and inherent vulnerability, a presumption arises to the effect that such party has 
a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the other.  The lawyer-client relationship 
falls in this category.  The following is a summary of some of the obligations of a lawyer 
that arise from the lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the client.  A lawyer must:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
longer regarded merely as a rule of evidence “, online: http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1979/1980scr1-
821/1980scr1-821.html  also, for a perspective from in-house counsel, see R. Patzelt, “Solicitor & Client 
Privilege: A Brief perspective from in-house counsel” The Canadian Bar Association, online: 
http://www.cba.org/CBA/newsletters/pdf/solicitor-client.pdf  
98 See Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809, 2004 SCC 31, where Justice 
Major wrote: “like corporate lawyers who also may give advice in an executive or non-legal capacity, 
where government lawyers give policy advice outside the realm of their legal responsibilities, such advice 
is not protected by the privilege” (emphasis added). 
99 Supra note 3, and discussion above. 
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• Represent his client with undivided loyalty; 
• Preserve his or her client’s confidences; and 
• Make full disclosure of all relevant and material information relating to his 
or her client’s interests.100 
The law concerning a lawyer’s fiduciary obligations is intertwined with the rules of ethics 
contained in the various Law Societies’ Codes of Professional Conduct.101  However, a 
lawyer may be found in breach of fiduciary duty even though she has not breached a rule 
of professional conduct.  The case of Stewart v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.102 arose 
out of a lawyer’s (Edward Greenspan) participation as host and narrator on a C.B.C. 
television program called “The Scales of Justice”.  During the television program the 
lawyer discussed a criminal negligence causing death case in which he had acted as a 
defence lawyer for Mr. Stewart thirteen years prior. After the program aired, Mr. Stewart 
sued his former lawyer (and the C.B.C.) for breach of contract and his fiduciary duties. 
The trial level judge emphasized the positive regulative ideal of a duty of loyalty.  He 
stated that: 
• lawyers are in an intense fiduciary relationship with their clients, and the 
relationship exists beyond the duration of the retainer; 
• the fiduciary relationship imposes a positive duty of loyalty; 
• loyalty is not dependent on confidentiality; it is a larger, freestanding obligation; 
• loyalty arises because of the vulnerability and dependency of clients vis-à-vis 
the lawyer; and 
• loyalty is crucial because the legal profession is an important social institution, 
and the public needs to have faith and confidence in such institutions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 S.M. Grant and L.R. Rothstein, Lawyers’ Professional Liability (1998) Butterworths Canada Ltd. at p. 
45. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Stewart v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., (1997), 150 D.L.R. (4th) 102 (Ont. Gen. Div.).	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As a result, the judge found that Mr. Greenspan breached the duty of loyalty by 
favouring his own financial interests, putting his own self-promotion before plaintiff’s 
interests, and increasing the adverse public effect on Mr. Stewart of the crimes he 
committed.103 
The most useful judicial guide to seeking further clarity in this distinction may 
well be the comment from the Supreme Court in Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights 
Commission)104 concerning the application of solicitor-client privilege to in-house 
government lawyers.  
In Pritchard v. Ontario, Justice Major stressed that that a fact-specific inquiry is 
needed when distinguishing between a corporate counsel’s legal and non-legal 
responsibilities.  He explained: 
Owing to the nature of the work of in-house counsel, often having both legal and 
non-legal responsibilities, each situation must be assessed on a case-by-case basis 
to determine if the circumstances were such that the privilege arose. Whether or 
not the privilege will attach depends on the nature of the relationship, the subject 
matter of the advice, and the circumstances in which it is sought and rendered 
(emphasis added) [.] 
 
The language in the Supreme Court Decision, and the results of the survey 
conducted as part of this research will form the foundation for the author’s proposed 3-
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  Richard F. Devlin and Victoria Rees, “Beyond Conflicts of Interest to the Duty of Loyalty: From Martin 
v. Gray to R. v. Neil” (2006) Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 at 439.	  
104	  Supra, note 98. 
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step procedure that can be used by a lawyer to determine whether a particular 
communication should be categorized as legal or non-legal advice.  This, in turn, may 
help predict whether it will be considered privileged or not.  This 3-step procedure is 
presented in the concluding chapter. 
(v) Conclusion 
Thus far, it has been established that attempts to distinguish ‘business advice’ 
from ‘legal advice’ may be misleading because sometimes business advice is legal 
advice.  It has also been established that when a lawyer relies on the retainer to determine 
the extent of his or her obligation to their client to consider and advise on a client’s 
business interests, there is potential for ambiguity.  The potential for ambiguity in 
understanding a lawyer’s obligation to provide his or her client with business advice does 
not resolve under case law generated by lawyers’ alleged tort liability in negligence.  The 
few cases discussed in this chapter ascertain that such obligation depends largely on the 
nature of the relationship between the lawyer and the client.  Relevant factors concerning 
the nature of the relationship between lawyer and client include the degree to which the 
client reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide business advice and also the 
sophistication of the client in business matters.  
Furthermore, it has been established that, in certain situations, lawyers may be 
obliged to provide non-legal advice.  An Ontario lawyer’s responsibility under the Rules 
only requires that where non-legal advice is provided, the lawyer must point it out and 
point out any lack of training that the lawyer has in respect of the non-legal advice and 
point out the loss of privilege by the client with respect to business advice.  
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Chapter 3 - Survey of Corporate Lawyers 
(i) Administration of the Survey 
One of the premises of this research is that corporate lawyers, as a segment of the 
legal profession, provide business advice to their clients.  Part of this research involves 
determining how these lawyers distinguish legal from business advice.  However, to 
assume that such lawyers actually do provide business advice, without asking them, 
would be to ignore the possibility that these lawyers do not perceive themselves as 
providing such advice.  Such possibilities, and other design imperatives led to the 
construction and distribution of a questionnaire to discover information about legal and 
business advice in corporate practice.105 
The survey was designed to collect data from individuals most likely to have 
engaged in providing business advice in the corporate context on a regular basis.  
Emphasis was therefore placed on seeking the participation of partners and associates in 
large business law firms,106 and lawyers in corporations large enough to employ in-house 
counsel.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 The research design and methodology of the survey was influenced by the methodology of a study by 
Vincent C. Alexander, cited previously, supra note 2. Another influence was the necessary approval for the 
protocol from the University of Western Ontario’s Non-Medical Research Ethics Board, see Appendix B. 
106 See: J. Heinz & E. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1982) at 36-83.  Heinz and Laumann’s study shows the correlation between the type of 
client and size the law firm.  This work concludes that the Bar is divided in two ‘‘hemispheres’’ that 
correspond to client type: the corporate Bar and the individual Bar. Lawyers in these two hemispheres are 
so distinct in their training, practice, and socioeconomic characteristics so as to be considered within 
different professions. Heinz and Laumann surmise that this division of the Bar’s social structure is reflected 
by a sharp distinction between law firms that serve corporate and individual clients; those that serve 
corporate clients do not serve individual clients and vice versa. These authors also conclude that lawyers in 
Chicago who represent large corporations are usually affiliated with firms of 30 or more partners (at 131).   
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The city of Toronto, Ontario, was an ideal site in which to administer the survey.  
At or about the time of the survey, Toronto contained the largest concentration in Canada 
of corporate headquarters.107  Toronto is also domicile of the greatest number of large law 
firms in Canada.108  
The survey was administered to two distinct populations, namely, corporate 
lawyers in private practice and corporate lawyers acting as in-house counsel. The in-
house counsel segment consisted of any known lawyers in the legal departments of 
corporations with headquarters in Toronto. 
The 2009-2010 Lexpert® CCCA/ACCJE Corporate Counsel Directory and 
Yearbook109 assisted in developing the sample.110  Surveys to corporate counsel were sent 
to only those companies listed in the 2010/2011 Lexpert CCCA/ACCJE Corporate 
Counsel Directory and Yearbook, 9th Edition. This edition of the Corporate Counsel 
Directory is a resource that contains company information, business listings and short 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 A. Gainer, & N. Esmail, Corporate Headquarters in Canada. The Fraser Institute, 2009, 10-11. 
108 See “The 2009 Who's Who in Canadian Law Firms: International Players, Domestic Heavyweights, and 
High-Performance Boutiques”, (2009), Lexpert, a Thomson Reuters business, prepared by Lexpert staff, 
available online: <http://www.lexpert.ca/Directory/DirectoryContent/FeatureArticles.aspx>.  
109 The 2009/2010 Lexpert CCCA/ACCJE Corporate Counsel: directory and Yearbook, 8th Edition, 
Thomson Reuters, 2009, Jean Cumming (editor).  
110 It would have been ideal to have obtained the co-operation of the Toronto section of the Canadian 
Corporate Counsel Association to develop a sample of corporate counsel. In 1988, the National Council of 
the Canadian Bar Association established the Canadian Corporate Counsel Association (CCCA) to replace 
its national corporate law section.  The provincial sections of the CBA then became CCCA Chapters and 
proceeded to elect the first CCCA Board of Directors.  Today, the relationship between the Canadian Bar 
Association and the CCCA provides membership in both organizations at no additional cost beyond the 
CBA membership fee, available: 
http://www.cancorpcounsel.org/EN/About_CCCA/About/Who_We_Are.aspx. Unfortunately the hoped-for 
cooperation did not manifest itself. 
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biographies of more than 4,000 Canadian corporate counsel.111 The directory is a 
reference directory for members of the Canadian Corporate Counsel Association 
(“CCCA”) and a resource to lawyers in a corporate setting.  
The CCCA states that its members are lawyers engaged in practice in 
corporations, business enterprises, associations, institutions, not-for-profit organizations, 
government and regulatory boards and agencies, Crown corporations, and regional or 
municipal corporations. It also welcomes associate members from law firms whose 
support and expertise enrich its educational programs and events.112 While the survey for 
Corporate Counsel was sent only to those lawyers listed in the 2010/2011 Lexpert 
CCCA/ACCJE Corporate Counsel Directory and Yearbook, the submission by a lawyer 
of a listing to the directory is both voluntary and free. Accordingly, it is difficult to more 
clearly define the demographic of this population because no further information is 
provided with regard to the lawyers who submit profiles.  
The second group of subjects comprised lawyers (either partners or associates) in 
large Toronto law firms (ten or more partners) who represented on their websites that 
they were part of a corporate practice group in corporate or commercial law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Online description of the 2011/2012 Lexpert CCA/ACCJE Corporate Counsel Directory and Yearbook, 
online: <http://www.carswell.com/product-detail/the-2011-lexpert-cccaaccje-corporate-counsel-directory-
and-yearbook/>. 
112 The Canadian Corporate Counsel Association “About the CCCA”, online: <http://www.ccca-
accje.org/En/about/main/default.aspx>. 
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Respondents for both target groups were selected pursuant to a two-stage random 
sampling technique.  Firstly, all eligible lawyers for each population were scrutinized 
according to the field of law they practice and, in the case of firms, for the lawyer’s status 
as associate or partner.113   
The second stage consisted of the selection of appropriate individuals as 
prospective respondents within each organization.114  In the in-house counsel survey, this 
person was always the head of the legal department of the particular corporation.  In the 
large law firms, the names of potential respondents within each firm were listed in 
random order.115  
On September 29, 2011, the first wave of emails was sent to lawyers in private 
practice.  The email asked these lawyers to complete an online survey.  Each email 
contained The University of Western Ontario’s letterhead, as well as a link to the Survey 
Monkey website where the survey was hosted.  A three-month window of opportunity 
was granted for the survey to be completed online.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See R. L. Nelson, “Ideology, Practice & Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships 
in the Large Firm” (1984-1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 503, which suggests that there are significant differences 
by field of law and partnership status when reporting the opportunity to give non-legal advice and that the 
field of litigation presents lawyers with fewer opportunities for giving non-legal advice.  
114 The head of the legal department of each corporation was easily ascertainable.  
115 Multiple respondents within a given firm were permitted, as the target information did not involve the 
firms, only the individual lawyer.  
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On the date on which the first tranche of emails was sent, an email was received 
from one respondent, which stated:  “I expect that you will not get too many responses to 
your email.  If you’d like to give me a call, I can explain why and suggest another 
approach.”  Indeed, as this correspondence predicted, not one completed survey was 
received after waiting three months.  
It is difficult to know how many questionnaires reached the eyes of the first 
tranche of intended respondents and how many people had the opportunity to decide 
whether or not to respond.  Given the high volume of “junk mail” in electronic mail these 
days, it is not unlikely that many persons deleted the email without ever reading it.  
However, the aforementioned email is confirmation that at least one person did receive 
and read the email and hence, it is likely that at least some other people did also receive 
and read the email.  
The one respondent who was kind enough to invite a call explained that lawyers 
are not comfortable responding “out of the blue”.  This lawyer stated that, from his 
personal experience, he believed it would be best to approach firms and through them, 
“get people to buy-into the survey”.116 Thereafter, this researcher sought assistance from 
five different large Toronto law firms and requested their support and assistance to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 This is consistent with what Y. Baruch and B.C. Holtom find in “Survey Response Rate Levels and 
Trends in Organizational Research”(2008) Human Relations 61(8) 1139-1160 at 1157, where they state 
that they believe that when researchers learn to collaborate actively with leaders to study their organization, 
the researchers will also gain insight into the contextual factors that will increase the probability of 
obtaining a high response rate from the individuals within that organization. Many of those inhibiting 
factors are beyond the control of the researcher; thus, without the assistance of managers, response rates 
can be negatively affected, resulting in potentially biased data.  
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administer the survey to a selection of each firm’s lawyers.  It was explained to each firm 
that the lawyers from each had been selected as target respondents based on area of 
practice and years of experience and that all responses would remain anonymous. 
However, not one firm was willing to provide assistance or support.  This reluctance of 
the firms to contribute to academic scholarship is best explained in the words of a 
member of one of the firms:  
… We are not interested in participating in the survey.  We make it a point not to 
discuss how we practice law, other than in our own marketing materials and other 
publicity that has been approved by the firm. 
 
Thereafter, the decision was made to send the questionnaire to individual lawyers 
via regular post.  The mail survey was an attractive alternative to the original Survey 
Monkey approach for gathering data from this well-defined population. The mail survey 
was expected to also provide good quality data. For studying sensitive topics, mail 
surveys often have been found to be less subject to 'desirability bias' -- i.e., the tendency 
of some respondents to give favorable answers about themselves.117 
  Accordingly, questionnaire in 2-page format (attached hereto as Appendix D) was 
mailed to a selection of lawyers who were members of the Law Society of Upper Canada 
as of March 1, 2012 and who resided in the province of Ontario and were in one of the 
two target groups: a) lawyers who worked in private practice and b) lawyers who worked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 The Institute for Social Research (York University), “Survey Research at ISR”, online: 
http://www.math.yorku.ca/ISR/survey.htm#. 
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as in-house counsel.  The questionnaires were mailed during March and April 2012, and 
the last questionnaire response was received in September 2012.   
(ii)  Design of the Survey Instrument 
The questionnaire was designed to survey whether lawyers characterize any of the 
advice they provide to their clients as “business advice”.  The questionnaire asks 
questions to determine related issues such as:  i) what do lawyers perceive as contributing 
to their own competency concerning business advice, ii) whether lawyers understand the 
boundary of their own competence, and iii) whether lawyers rely on codes of ethics when 
providing their professional services.  
The survey instrument contained a combination of forced-response and open-
ended questions and was designed to obtain both quantitative and qualitative data.  It 
attempted to uncover the types of situations in which lawyers think they are required to 
provide business advice.  Secondly, it sought to reveal lawyers’ views on their own 
competency and ethical requirements in those situations by asking them to self-report 
concerning these matters. 
The objective in examining competence was not be to measure competence per 
se; rather it was to discover whether lawyers understand the requirement and boundary of 
their own competence in providing professional services to their clients.  Furthermore, it 
sought to uncover whether practicing lawyers consider codes and rules to be the essential 
factor when making an authentic judgment about the ethical requirements involved in 
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providing business advice, or whether they use autonomous ethical reasoning118 which 
recognizes that rules and codes are constraints placed on the decision-maker.119  Previous 
work has supported the view that Canadian lawyers see their roles as “being warranted by 
factors which lie behind or apart from the sources of the models in legal literature or in 
ethical codes.”120  However, this is not to say that lawyers have not been shown to be 
concerned with the tensions of specific solicitor-client relationships and their overall 
obligations to society in previous research, for indeed they have been so shown.121 
This questionnaire sought to determine whether lawyers feel obligated to provide 
business advice.122 For example, it asks if when making a decision to provide or not 
provide business advice as part of their professional services, do lawyers rely on expertise 
from their own experience, or do they look to ethical codes for guidance?  Do they think 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118  Thomas Franck distinctively named “ethical autonomy”. See, in general Edward Weisband & Thomas 
M. Franck, Resignation in Protest: Political and Ethical Choices between Loyalty to Team and Loyalty to 
Conscience in American Public Life, Penguin Books 1976.  Also see, David A.J. Richards “Moral Theory, 
The Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism” 31 J. Legal Educ.359, 361 as 
cited in S.G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, (1996) 10 Georgetown J. of Legal Ethics, 33, 40.  
119 For an excellent discussion, which explores a model describing how lawyers make ethical decisions in 
their practices, see S.G. Kupfer, “Authentic Legal Practices” (1996) Geo. J. of Legal Ethics 33.   
120 See M. A. Wilkinson, P. Mercer & T.  Strong, Mentor, Mercenary or Melding: An Empirical Inquiry 
into the Role of the Lawyer, (1996) 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 373, 410 (none of the lawyers in the study 
mentioned either the relevant literature or any ethical code of conduct in their decision making, see footnote 
192). 
121 M. A. Wilkinson, C. Walker, and P. Mercer, Testing Theory and Debunking Sterotypes: Lawyers’ Views 
on the Practice of Law, (January 2005) 18 1 Can. J. Law and Jur. online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313151 
(see conclusion). 
122	  In	  the	  original	  design	  of	  the	  survey	  a	  supplemental	  question	  sought	  to	  determine	  the	  lawyers	  
perceptions	  of	  relative	  client	  demand	  for	  business	  advice	  (rather	  than	  their	  obligation).	  	  However,	  the	  
respondents	  did	  not	  answer	  the	  question	  (question	  6)	  properly.	  	  They	  did	  not	  indicate	  the	  demand	  for	  
category	  in	  terms	  of	  percentage	  of	  their	  workload,	  and	  hence	  the	  results	  were	  not	  sufficiently	  accurate	  for	  
analysis.	  	  This	  question	  was	  eliminated	  from	  the	  analysis	  and	  is	  not	  further	  reported	  in	  this	  research.	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that they have a duty to provide business advice, either due to their professional 
obligation or because of any legal obligation through contract via their retainer, case law 
or otherwise?  As previously mentioned, research by Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa 
Walker and Peter Mercer123 found that the ethical codes of the profession are not 
considered by members of the legal profession as either relevant or binding in solving 
most of their dilemmas.  Their research program found that lawyers viewed their roles, 
whether as counselors or as hired guns, as being warranted by factors which lie behind or 
apart from the sources of the models in legal literature or in ethical codes.124  For 
example, although expertise is a fundamental element in the notion of professionalism, 
participants stated that their expertise required them to act in a counseling capacity, rather 
than acknowledging that their professional obligations compelled their action per se.125   
While earlier work has suggested that lawyers of a more senior vintage might not 
have been accustomed to looking at codes of ethics when making a decision to provide or 
not provide business advice as part of their professional services - because the Law 
Society of Upper Canada did not even produce its first Professional Conduct Handbook 
(the “Handbook”) until 1964126 - this was not the expectation of this research being 
conducted nearly 50 years after the first Handbook.  However, it was not until 1978 that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Ibid.   
124 Supra note 120. 
125 Supra note 124 at 411. 
126 D. Robinson, “Ethical Evolution: The Development of the Professional Conduct Handbook of the Law 
Society of Upper Canada” (1995) 29 L. Soc. Gaz. 162. [Robinson, “Ethical Evolution”]. 
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the duty of a lawyer to clearly distinguish his legal advice from non-legal advice was 
made explicit as discussed earlier.  
Lastly, the survey involves determining what concerns lawyers the most when 
they provide business advice.  It seeks to find out whether lawyers are primarily 
concerned about their competency when providing business advice, the distinction 
between legal and business advice, and whether they are concerned about other issues.  
For example, are lawyers more concerned about maintaining solicitor-client privilege for 
advice that is “business” in nature, or acting within the scope of their professional 
indemnity insurance policy?   
 
(iii)  Response to the Survey 
Forty-one (41) questionnaires were returned for lawyers in private practice, 
comprising a response rate of 16% (N=256).127  Thirty-eight (38) questionnaires were 
returned for lawyers serving as in-house counsel, comprising a response rate of 18% 
(N=211).128,129 A mail survey achieves a lower response rate than other methods of 
distribution.130  Given the challenges to the original email and online distribution of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 256 surveys were sent to lawyers in private practice (n=256). 
128 211 surveys were sent to lawyers acting as corporate counsel (n=211). 
129 15 surveys from the corporate counsel group were returned because the addressee had either moved or 
was no longer working at the addressed place of employment. 
130 LB. Bourque & E.P. Fieldler, “How to Conduct Self-Administered and Mail Surveys”, Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, California. (1995), at pg. 14.  
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questionnaire that were encountered and discussed above, this rate of response to the 
mailed questionnaire is robust.  
It has been reported that when a single mailing that incorporates no incentives is 
made to a sample of the general community, the surveyor can expect no better than a 
20% response rate.131  This is consistent with the response rate achieved here.  
Other similar studies that did not face the same distribution challenges as this 
study have achieved similar response rates.  For example, Joan Brockman reports an 
overall 29% response rate to a 1990 questionnaire she mailed to all lawyers who were 
members of the Law Society of British Columbia.132  In her subsequent studies, 
Brockman obtained greater response rates. However, she was also able to include a 
covering letter signed by the then current Secretary of the governing Law Society.133 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Supra note 130 at 15. 
132 See J. Brockman, “Gender Bias in the Legal Profession:  A Survey of Members of the Law Society of 
British Columbia”, (1992) 17 Queens L.J. 91 at 100.  See also: K. Robson & J.E. Wallace, “Gendered 
Inequalities in Earnings: A Study of Canadian Lawyers”, (2001) 38 Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology 75 at 82.    Robson & Wallace report a 39% response rate to a 1994 mail survey of 1,300 
active members of the legal profession in a large Western Canadian city. 
133 See J. Brockman, “Bias in the Legal Profession: Perceptions and Experiences”, (1992) 30 Alta L. Rev. 
747, see also: J. Brockman, “Leaving the Practice of Law” The Wherefores and the Whys”, (1994) 32 Alta 
L. Rev. 116. See also F.M. Kay in “Crossroads to Innovation and Diversity: The Careers of Women 
Lawyers In Quebec” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 699 at 713 (“Crossroads to Innovation”). This study offers 
insight into typical response rates for surveys of legal professionals.  Dr. Kay reported that her own study 
achieved a response rate of 60% for a 1999 survey she sent to members of the Barreau du Quebec. 
However, she acknowledges that this response rate is significantly higher than that obtained through most 
surveys of professionals, where response rates of 30%-50% are more typical. See F.M. Kay – “The Careers 
of Women Lawyers in Quebec” (2001-2002) 47 McGill L.J. 713 at 78; J. Brockman, “Gender Bias in the 
Legal Profession:  A Survey of Members of the Law Society of British Columbia” (1992) 17 Queen’s L.J. 
91 at 100; K. Robson & J.E. Wallace, “Gendered Inequalities in Earnings; a study of Canadian Lawyers” 
(2001) 38 Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 75 at 82; J.E. Wallace, “Corporatist Control 
and Organizational Commitment among Professionals: The Case of Lawyers Working in Law Firms” 
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Very few lawyers who responded were called to the Bar before 1978, when, as 
mentioned above, the duty of a lawyer to distinguish legal advice from non-legal advice 
was made explicit.  In private practice, only 7 of 41 lawyers (17%) were called to the Bar 
before 1980 (and only 1 before 1971!); in-house, only 4 (11%).   These numbers are too 
small to analyze in terms of differences in actions, attitudes, and use of codes, compared 
to those called later and, in any event, all lawyers currently in practice, no matter their 
year of call, have the same obligations.   
Importantly, the study design contemplated equal groups of lawyers in private 
practice and in-house.  And those proportions of respondents to this survey are indeed 
roughly equal: 52% (41) in private practice and 48% (38) in-house.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1995) 73 Social Forces 822.  In the Crossroads to Innovation study, one thousand lawyers were mailed a 
28-page booklet questionnaire.  Each questionnaire was accompanied by a letter of introduction from the 
Chair of the Women in the Legal Profession Committee at the Barreau du Quebec.  Also, lawyers in the 
original random sample were sent a postcard reminder after two weeks.  A follow-up letter of 
encouragement was sent to non-respondents after one month, and a follow-up postcard reminder after 
another two weeks.  The study acknowledges that these follow-up efforts served to enhance the response 
rate.  
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Chapter 4 - Survey Results 
(i) Results Related to Respondents’ Actions 
The results of the survey will be summarized according to three categories: a) 
how respondents act in their practices and b) the respondents’ attitudes surrounding the 
giving of advice and c) the respondents use of ethical codes.134   
How respondents act in their practices is revealed in includes questions 3, 7, 9, 
and 4(a)-(c) from the survey, which is attached hereto as Appendix D.  In their responses 
to question 3 the respondents indicated whether they provide business advice or not.  The 
responses to question 7 are reported next because whether a lawyer’s clients send copies 
of business correspondence will support whether the lawyer’s practice has non-legal 
aspects.  The responses to question 9 provide evidence about whether lawyers have 
consciously refrained from providing business advice.  Finally, the responses to questions 
4(a)-(c) provide evidence about the circumstances in which lawyers do consciously 
provide business advice.   
The respondents’ attitudes toward their legal practices are revealed in their 
answers to questions 4(d), 5, 8 and 10 from the survey, which is attached hereto as 
Appendix D.  The responses to question 4(d) show what the lawyers who articulate they 
have given business advice believe are their grounds.  The lawyers’ responses to question 
5 help explicate, for those lawyers who do knowingly give business advice, whether they 
believe they are under a duty to do so.  The lawyers’ responses to questions 8 and 11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Refer to Appendix D for a quantitative summary of various survey questions. 
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provide important evidence of their attitudes surrounding the nature and extent of both 
legal and business advice.  
The respondents reported use of ethical codes is revealed in questions 10 and 4(f).  
These responses establish whether the respondents look to ethics codes and also whether 
they feel that the Rules speak to lawyers about providing business advice. 
In each of the three categories of questions, it was important to establish whether 
the responses of those in private practice differed from the response of those lawyers 
acting as in-house counsel.  Accordingly, for every question, a chi-square analysis was 
performed.  In terms of actions of the lawyers, no significant differences were found 
between the two groups (as will be seen).  In terms of the lawyers’ attitudes, however, 
there was a significant difference found between in-house and private practice lawyers 
over their agreement that there are “murky lines” between business and legal advice (see 
question 11 below).  Similarly, pertaining to the lawyers’ use of ethical codes, a 
significant difference was found between the two groups of lawyers in terms of the codes 
to which they refer in connection with giving business advice (question 4(f)).  
Nature of Non-Legal Duties (Question 3) 
Question 3(a) provided an opportunity for respondents to give a brief description 
of the nature of the types of non-legal duties that they perform and hence, provided 
insight into how they define “non-legal duties”. As may be seen in “Table 1: Nature of 
Non-Legal Duties”, there were no significant differences found between the groups of in-
house counsel and those in private practice on this question.  
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The activities defined as “non-legal duties” by both sets of respondents included the 
following:  
• Working on committee, administrative and business matters 
• Marketing 
• Recruitment and Human Resources 
• Educating and Mentoring Junior Lawyers 
• Strategic Deal analysis 
• Pro Bono work (1 lawyer) 
• Communications 
• Providing Notary Services for Employees 
• Industry relations 
• Risk Management and Compliance 
It may be noted that the first four items on the list are duties which would not engage a 
lawyer in direct communication with clients and therefore could not be related to the 
giving of advice, either business or legal advice.135  Five of the categories mentioned as 
‘non-legal’ duties do involve interactions with clients: strategic deal analysis, pro bono 
work, providing notarial services136, industry relations, and risk management and 
compliance.   
There was no significant difference between the populations in how they view 
their non-legal duties.  Both groups under study identified working on committees, 
administrative and business matters as the dominant non-legal activities performed.  
Other non-legal duties comprised an assortment of varied tasks.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Since these categories are derived from open-ended responses, it is difficult to say whether 
‘communications’ would relate to communications relating to the firm or to the clients, and hence it is 
difficult to say whether advice is involved, either business or legal. 
136 To the extent that notarial services are provided to employees, then in respect of those employees, such 
employees would be clients from a professional perspective.  
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 It should be noted that no lawyer specified any activity that would be considered 
business advice as a non-legal duty unless one conceives of risk management and 
compliance as business advice. Potentially, risk management and compliance may be 
qualified as business advice.  Otherwise, it does not appear that these lawyers consider 
‘business advice’ as a non-legal activity. 
These lawyers appear to view the distinction between “legal advice” and 
“business advice” as “business” versus “legal”, rather than a distinction of “legal” versus 
“non-legal”.  Otherwise, these lawyers would have included “business advice” in their 
“non-legal” activities.  In Chapter 5, this author will propose an approach to looking at 
this legal versus non-legal distinction, which allows for business advice to qualify as both 
legal and non-legal. 
Table 1: Nature of Non-Legal Duties 
Chi-square value: 0.35; df=1 
 Private Practice In-house Counsel Totals 
Work on committee, 
administrative, and 
business matters 
26 
(27) 
 
17 
(16) 
43 
All other non-legal 
activities 
28 
(27) 
 
14 
(15) 
42 
Totals 54 31 85 
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Purpose of Correspondence (Question 7) 
Question seven asked the respondent lawyers whether their clients send them copies of 
their business correspondence or memorandums without a specific request or legal advice 
being required.  Question seven then asked those lawyers who answered in the 
affirmative, what the purpose of their client was in doing so.  As may be seen in “Table 2: 
Purpose of Correspondence” there were no significant differences found between the in-
house counsel and those in private practice on this question.   The absolute data for both 
groups of lawyers is graphed below and depicted in Figure 1.   
 
Table 2: Purpose of Correspondence  
Chi-square value: 1.14; df=2 
 
 
 
 
 Private Practice In-house Counsel Totals 
Keep me 
informed and 
solicit my 
counsel 
18 
(16) 
 
 
15 
(17) 
 
 
33 
All other 
purposes 
14 
(16) 
 
 
20 
(18) 
 
 
34 
Totals 32 35 67 
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Figure 1: Purpose of Correspondence 
 
 
 
 Of those lawyers who did receive copies of business correspondence or 
memorandums from their clients without a specific request or legal advice being 
required, only one respondent specified that the purpose for doing so was to create 
privilege.  The lawyers specified unique reasons why their clients sent them this type of 
correspondence.  For example, the unique reasons that the lawyers gave are as follows: 
• Liability management 
• Suggesting a tactical approach 
• Counsel is part of management team 
• Counsel is part of legal team 
• Second opinion 
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• Create privilege 
With the exception of the creation of privilege in the list above, each of these additional 
reasons implies that from the lawyers’ perspective, the underlying rationale for a client 
sending such correspondence is for the purpose of receiving that lawyer’s advice.  
 The explanations given by these lawyers are similar to those in the Alexander 
study.137  The Alexander study found three reasons for sending of business 
correspondence.  The three reasons mentioned most frequently overall, in descending 
order, were: (1) to inform the lawyer of developments in particular matters as to which 
legal assistance previously had been provided or was currently being sought; (2) to obtain 
the lawyer’s comments on any legal problems the lawyer may perceive and (3) to keep 
the lawyer informed about general corporate business.138   
 Any lawyer who is a member of the management team is intimately involved in 
the business affairs of such client.  It seems logical to assume that a client would seek 
direct advice from someone so involved in the business affairs of the company.  This is 
supported by the Alexander study, which reports that most executives come into contact 
with in-house counsel most frequently.139    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  Alexander study supra note 2 at 344. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Alexander Study, supra note 2 at p.349. 
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 Withholding Business Advice (Question 9) 
 This question asked whether the respondent lawyers had ever refrained from 
providing their clients with business advice, and if they had, what their reason was for 
doing so. This question was helpful to determine whether lawyers are primarily 
concerned about a) their competency when providing business advice, b) the distinction 
between legal and business advice or, c) other issues. For example, lawyers could be 
concerned with maintaining solicitor-client privilege for advice that is business in nature, 
or about acting within the scope of their professional indemnity insurance policy.  
 The table below entitled “Table 3: Withholding Business Advice” shows that 
there were no significant differences found between the in-house counsel and those in 
private practice on this question.   The absolute data for both groups of lawyers is 
graphed below in Figure 2. 
 One major reason for the lawyers’ withholding of business advice is concern 
associated with competency and lack of knowledge.  Other reasons included lack of 
demand by their clients and appropriateness of advice.  
 The absence of responses to this question was also interesting.  For example, no 
one reported that they chose to refrain from providing business advice because of concern 
about maintaining solicitor-client privilege.  Neither did anyone mention that they were 
concerned about acting within the scope of their professional indemnity insurance policy.  
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 Accordingly, it seems that the lens through which these lawyers view business 
advice is consistent with the LSUC’s Rules of Professional Conduct, where the 
foundational principle underlying the giving of business advice has to do with 
competency. 
 Regardless of the source from which these lawyers attribute the duty to provide 
business advice, they view their restriction in providing it primarily from a competency 
perspective.  
 
Table 3: Withholding Business Advice 
Chi-square value: 1.14; df=2 
 Private Practice In-house Counsel Totals 
Not appropriate 8 
(7) 
 
 
5 
(6) 
 
 
 
13 
Not in position to 
give advice due to 
lack of knowledge 
14 
(16) 
 
 
17 
(15) 
 
 
 
31 
All other Reasons 10 
(9) 
 
8 
(9) 
 
18 
Totals 32 30 77                               
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Figure 2: Reasons for Refraining from Providing Business Advice  
 
 
Circumstances in which Business Advice is Provided (Question 4(a)-(c)) 
Question four asked the respondent lawyers about the circumstances under which 
they provide business advice.  In response to part (a) of this question, the respondents 
first stated that they do all provide "business advice" (question 4(a)).  This includes 23 
lawyers who reported that they do not perform non-legal duties for their firm. This 
reinforces the finding that these lawyers’ attitudes surrounding business advice is siloed. 
When these lawyers conceptualize business advice, they do not report such advice as a 
“non-legal” duty.  When asked in question 4(b) about how often they give business 
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advice, most lawyers said “occasionally”, fewer said frequently and very few said that 
they rarely provide business advice. 
Question 4(c) was an open question, asking under what circumstances lawyers 
usually give business advice.  As may be seen in “Table 5: Circumstances in which 
Business Advice is Provided” there were no significant differences found between the in-
house counsel and those in private practice on this question regarding the occasions on 
which lawyers provided business advice. The absolute data, that is, the actual responses 
that make up the “all other circumstances”, is shown in Figure 3, for both groups of 
lawyers.  The category “client requires help with assessing options as to how to proceed 
(legal and business combined)” is also shown in Figure 3.   
Both groups under study strongly reported that the circumstances under which 
they provide business advice pertains to the situation where their client requires help with 
assessing options on how to proceed.  There were additional sets of circumstances in 
which business advice was given, namely: a) team cross-functional meeting and b) 
participation in business discussion on the management team (question 4(c)).  
When lawyers provide business advice, they seek to explicitly segregate the 
business advice from the legal advice based on the following descending frequency: 
always, frequently, occasionally, rarely and never (question 4(e)). 
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Table 5: Circumstances in which Business Advice is Provided  
Chi-square value: 1.88; df=1 
 
Figure 3: Circumstances of Business Advice 
 
 
 Private Practice In-house Counsel Totals 
Client requires help with 
assessing options as to how 
to proceed (legal and 
business combined) 
27 
(24) 
18 
(21) 
45 
All other circumstances 21 
(24) 
25 
(22) 
46 
Totals 48 43 91 
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(ii) Respondents’ Attitudes  
Grounds Relied Upon When Providing Advice (Question 4(d)) 
Having established the circumstances under which both sets of lawyers provide 
business advice to their clients, the grounds upon which they rely when providing such 
advice may be established.  As may be seen in “Table 6: Grounds Relied Upon”, there 
were no significant differences found between the in-house counsel and those in private 
practice on this question.    
 The grounds that lawyers rely on when providing business advice are similar for both 
sets of respondents.  They rely on experience, self-study, continuing education, formal 
training and third parties.    
 
Table 6: Grounds Relied Upon 
Chi-square value: 7.85; df=5 
 
 Private Practice In-house Counsel Totals 
Experience gained 
within law practice  
41 
(36) 
33 
(38) 
74 
Self Study 15 
(16) 
18 
 
(17) 
33 
Continuing 
Education 
8 
(13) 
19 
(14) 
27 
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Experience Outside 
Law Practice 
25 
(21) 
 
19 
(23) 
 
44 
Reliance on Third 
Party 
6 
(8) 
11 
(9) 
17 
Formal Training 
(courses, degrees) 
12 
(13) 
14 
(13) 
26 
Totals 107 114 221 
 
Is there a duty to provide business advice? (Question 5) 
This question examined whether lawyers think that they have a duty to provide 
business advice, either due to their professional obligations or because of any legal 
obligation through contract via their retainer, case law or otherwise. 
If the responses establish that the respondents believe that there is a duty to 
provide clients with business advice, then the source of such obligation may be 
examined. For example, the follow-up questions in 5(a) (i), (ii), and (iii) will reveal the 
source of the perceived obligation, possibly a contractual relationship with the client, 
professional obligation(s) and other personal views. 
  Both populations were similar in their belief as to whether or not they have a duty 
to provide business advice. As may be seen in “Table 7: Duty to Provide Business 
Advice”, there were no significant differences found between the in-house counsel and 
those in private practice on this question.   The majority of respondents felt that they did 
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not have a duty to provide business advice. However, concurrently the most answered 
question in the whole survey was about the circumstances in which they do provide 
business advice.140 The incongruence between these two attitudes is strange because the 
latter observation seems to imply that there are circumstances in which lawyers do 
provide business advice and hence, must feel some duty to do so.  However, when asked 
more directly, as shown in Table 8, those same lawyers deny that such a duty exists.  
 It is important to comment on the context in which this observation is made.  For 
example, the legal profession is structured in such a way that providing any advice puts 
lawyers in a liability situation. When lawyers provide the very service for which they are 
trained, they automatically expose themselves to liability.  Accordingly, it seems almost 
implicit that lawyers would be reluctant to provide advice without some duty to do so.  
There is an apparent incongruence here, namely that these lawyers deny that there is a 
duty to provide business advice and yet offer a number of circumstances in which they do 
provide such advice.   
 From the data, it appears that oftentimes business advice is provided in 
combination with legal advice and that this is as a result of client demand.  On the other 
hand, many lawyers refrain from providing a client with business advice because of 
concerns associated with lack of knowledge141.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Refer to Appendix E. 
141 Refer to question 9. 
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 To summarize, there were many circumstances in which the respondents provided 
business advice. However, the majority of the lawyers under study did not feel that they 
had a duty to provide business advice. Furthermore, the most cited reason given for 
refraining from providing a client with business advice was due to concerns around lack 
of knowledge.  So, even though most lawyers did not feel that they had a duty to provide 
business advice, they did report providing such advice. Accordingly, they need to 
understand how to make the distinction between legal and business advice for their own 
purposes, to comply with the Rules and to understand the scope of their insurance 
coverage.  
Table 7: Duty to Provide Business Advice  
Chi-square value: 0.09; df=1 
 Private Practice In-house Counsel Totals 
Yes 11 
(12) 
 
11 
(10) 
 
22 
No (and “no 
opinion”) 
29 
(28) 
25 
(26) 
54 
Totals 40 36 76 
 
The respondent lawyers who thought that they had a duty to provide business 
advice advanced various explanations about the underlying source of that duty (refer to 
Table 8).  The cell sizes in Table 8 are too small to permit the chi-square test for 
statistical significance.  Nonetheless, Table 8 provides an interesting tabulation of the raw 
data.  
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Table 8: Duty to Provide Business Advice, Combined Answers 
 
 Interestingly, for such respondents as did feel there is a duty to provide business 
advice, they expressed that such duty arose because of a contract with their client and 
they also reported that the duty arose because of professional obligations.  The responses 
were additive, meaning that they felt both contract and professional obligation contribute 
to a duty to provide business advice.  
 This is quite important because it seems to imply that those respondents felt that 
there was more than one source of duty to provide business advice. The respondents did 
not solely express from where the duty derived.  Rather, they articulated an additional 
duty toward the same goal.  
Combined answers to question 5(a)(i), (ii), (ii) a, 
& (iii) 
Private 
Practice 
In-house 
Counsel 
(i) Duty arises from contract with client 5 4 
   
(ii) Duty arises from professional obligation 0 2 
   
(ii)(a)     
LSUC Rules of Professional Conduct 1 0  
General obligation to help your client and work 
in their best interest 
2 2 
Part of job as in-house counsel  0 1 
Being a good legal advisor requires taking into 
account business implications  
1 1 
   
(iii)   
As part of providing experience and judgement 
in the context of providing advice 
4 7 
Depends on the circumstances  1 0 
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 Ideally, the interaction of these two duties requires a framework, which allows for 
flexibility in order to reconcile any conflicting demands of the duty between these two 
perceived sources.  Chapter five of this thesis provides such a framework. 
Difficulty in Distinguishing Business Advice from Legal Advice (Question 8) 
  As may be seen in “Table 9: Difficulty in Distinguishing Business Advice from 
Legal Advice”, there were no significant differences found between the in-house counsel 
and those in private practice on this question.  Three quarters of all respondents stated 
that they did not have difficulty distinguishing between legal and business advice.  
Table 9: Difficulty in Distinguishing Business Advice from Legal Advice 
Chi-square value: 1.57, df=1 
 Private Practice In-house Counsel Totals 
Yes 8 
(10) 
 
11 
(9) 
 
19 
No 34 
(32) 
 
24 
(26) 
 
58 
Totals 42 35 77 
 
Do “Murky Lines” Exist? (Question 11(a) and (b)) 
This question asked the respondents whether they find that “murky lines” exist 
when they try to distinguish legal advice from business advice. The respondents were 
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divided into two categories, those who believed that murky lines exist, and those that did 
not. Each group provided reasons for why they thought murky lines existed or not.   
Table 4: Murky Lines 
Chi-square value: 6.66; df=1 
 Private Practice In-house Counsel Totals 
Yes (murky lines 
exist) 
15 
(20) 
 
21 
(16) 
 
36 
No (murky lines do 
not exist) 
22 
(17) 
8 
(13) 
30 
Totals 37 29 66 
 
The absolute results for responses to this question are set out in table 4 above and 
the figures below. The inferential chi-square tests on these data indicate that there is a 
significant difference between lawyers in private practice and in-house counsel with 
regard to whether they feel that murky lines exist or not.  
Both groups provided reasons for why they thought murky lines did or did not 
exist.  These responses are grouped into the categories listed below in Tables 4A and 4B.  
These data are all the more important because they are generated from open-
ended responses generated by the subjects themselves.  It is important to note that the 
dominant opinion about why murky lines exist for many lawyers is that legal issues have 
business implications.  More than seventy-five percent of those who felt murky lines 
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existed felt that the murkiness existed because legal issues have business implications.142  
Indeed, of those who did provide further information about why murky lines existed in 
their minds, only one gave any other answer and it was an answer that must by definition 
be unique to a lawyer in a in-house counsel position.  
Table 4A: Murky Lines Exist 
Category A Respondents (Murky Lines Exist) Private Practice In-house 
Counsel 
As the employee of the organization and its legal 
counsel lines get blurred 
0  1 
Legal issues have business implications 9 22 
No answer provided  6 2 
 
Table 4B: No Murky Lines Exist 
Category B Respondents (No Murky Lines Exist) Private Practice In-
house 
Counsel 
It is clear what is a legal issue and what is not 6 2 
Limit business advice to recommendations relating to 
available business options 
1  0 
Legal analysis is one input in deciding a course of 
action 
5 4 
Fell into category A or no answer provided  10 2 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 These five words were taken from at least one answer and other similar language was coded by the 
researcher at the same time. 
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Figure 4: Murky Lines Exist, Private Practice 
 
Legal	  issues	  have	  business	  implications	  therefore	  not	  easy	  to	  distinguish	  60%	  
no	  answer	  provided	  	  40%	  
Category	  A	  Respondents	  (Murky	  Lines	  Exist):	  
Private	  Practice	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Figure 5: No Murky Lines Exist, Private Practice 
 
 
Figure 6: Murky Lines Exist, Corporate Counsel 
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Figure 7: No Murky Lines Exist, Corporate Counsel 
 
 
There was a noticeable and significant difference in the way in which the two 
groups of respondents, those in private practice and the in-house counsel, answered this 
question. The large majority of in-house counsel (71%) felt that lines could get blurred or 
that legal issues have business implications and are therefore not easy to distinguish. On 
the other hand, only 28% of lawyers in private practice felt that murky lines exist. The 
rest of the lawyers in private practice did not answer or they felt that there were no murky 
lines. 
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(iii) Respondents Use of Ethical Codes 
Do the Law Society’s Rules of Professional Conduct speak to Lawyers regarding 
business advice? (Question 10) 
The majority of respondents stated that the Rules do “speak” to lawyers regarding 
business advice (approximately 75%).  Only 3 of 27 private practice respondents, and 5 
of 24 in-house counsel respondents were able to identify any specific rule.  Clearly, the 
Rules are not regularly referenced with regard to their guidance on business advice.  
 
Do Lawyers Look to Ethical Codes in Connection with Giving Business Advice? 
(Question 4(f)). 
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker and Peter Mercer143 report that lawyers 
are not actually looking to the Rules to solve ethical dilemmas.  Professor Wilkinson’s 
team found that the ethical codes of the profession are not considerer by members of the 
legal profession as either relevant or binding in solving most of their dilemmas.  The 
research program, found that lawyers viewed their roles, as being warranted by factors, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Testing Theory and Debunking Stereotypes: Lawyers’ Views on the Practice of Law, supra note 121. 
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which lie behind or apart from the sources of the models in legal literature or in ethical 
codes.144   
When asked directly in this research survey (question 4(f)) whether they looked at 
any ethical codes in providing business advice, the majority of the lawyers under study 
reported that they do not look to any ethical codes in connection with providing business 
advice to their clients.  As may be seen in Table 10, there was a significant difference 
found between the responses of the in-house counsel and those of lawyers in private 
practice.    
Although the majority of the lawyers under study reported that they do not look to 
any ethical codes in connection with providing business advice to their clients, some did. 
In-house counsel reported looking to ethical codes, however they define them, more than 
lawyers in private practice.  Interestingly, only two lawyers referenced either the 
Canadian Bar Association (CBA) or the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) 
guidelines.  The other sources were “corporate policies”, “client’s interest” and “honest 
advice”.  Of note, is that corporate policies are referred to as ethical guidelines more than 
are the LSUC Rules.  The finding warrants further research. 
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Table 10: Guidance from Ethical Codes 
Chi-square value: 12.1; df=1 
 
	  
(iii) Conclusions from Survey Data 
It is a key finding from this research that in two parts of this questionnaire there 
was a significant difference between the private practice lawyers and the in-house 
counsel lawyers.  It is also important to note however, as a key outcome of this survey, 
that all lawyers, regardless of work circumstances, generally approach the issues of 
ethical and professional responsibility in similar ways.  The two exceptions to a common 
treatment of by all lawyers of ethical and professional responsibility that this research 
establishes is: a) that lawyers in private practice are not as willing to admit that  “murky 
lines” exist when distinguishing legal advice from business advice as those practicing in-
house are, and b) practitioners in private practice look to ethical codes less frequently in 
providing business advice than do those practicing in-house. 
 Answers to 
question 4(f) 
In-house Counsel Private Practice Totals 
Yes 13 (7) 3 (9) 16 
No 17 (23) 36 (30) 53 
Totals 30 39 69 
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It was central to this research to study both lawyers in private practice and in-
house counsel and to design the study such that the two groups could be compared.  Prior 
to this study, it was unknown whether the actions, attitudes and use of ethical codes of 
these groups of lawyers were the same or different because no study had examined this 
issue.   
Although in-house counsel had a much greater tendency to find that there were 
murky lines when they tried to distinguish legal and business advice, they did not differ 
in their assessment of their abilities to make the distinction.  It seems reasonable to infer 
that this may be because all lawyers have experience in segregating the two types of 
advice.  In considering the areas in which they are common and different, it may be 
observed that it is possible to reconcile the two.  Although lawyers in corporate practice 
saw more murky lines between legal and business advice, this research establishes that 
they also more frequently refer to ethical codes.  Because they are able and willing to 
refer to ethical codes to help them with the murkiness that they perceive, it is therefore 
understandable that in the end, both the in-house counsel who perceive a problem and 
have a ready resource for guidance and the private practitioners who do not see any 
ambiguity and therefore don’t need to refer to that resource, see themselves as able to 
easily distinguish between legal and business advice.  
 This survey and canvass of primary legal sources establishes unequivocally that 
the boundaries between the giving of legal advice and the giving of business advice are 
difficult to articulate for the courts, the rule-makers, and those who need to interpret the 
Rules in light of the demands of practice.  Nonetheless, the necessity of understanding the 
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limitations of the lawyer’s ability to give business advice is demonstrably a reality for 
those in corporate practice, whether in private practice or in-house. And yet, this data also 
shows that those practicing in-house recognize the challenge of distinguishing between 
business and legal advice more readily and seek guidance from ethics codes more readily 
than those in private practice.    
 The fact that lawyers in private practice and in-house lawyers differ in their 
approaches in respect of the giving of business advice may or may not be important in 
terms of the responsibility of the LSUC to safeguard the public interest.  As long as a 
lawyer’s conduct is in compliance with the Rules, it is not necessary to show that that 
lawyer derives his or her conduct by immediate reference to those rules.  This argument 
will be further explored in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5 - Exploring a Model for Practical Decision Making and Distinguishing 
Legal and Business Advice 
 
(i)  Introducing Practical Reasonableness 
In “Natural Law and Natural Rights”145, John Finnis, a noted legal philosopher 
begins his thinking with the proposition that we need, for the sake of the common good to 
be law abiding.  The question is how, in a given situation, to reconcile duties imposed on 
us by law that appear to be conflicting.  It is the case that such “conflicts” according to 
Finnis must be reconcilable by establishing priorities of obligation according to the extent 
to which the rules at issue focus on the common good.  A lawyer’s obligation in terms of 
professional conduct if specific rules appear to conflict can according to Finnis be 
reconciled by prioritizing those most closely targeted to the achievement of the common 
good.   In the findings of this survey of Ontario lawyers, this research has established that 
though they have an obligation, which requires ethical decision-making, a majority of 
lawyers do not refer to Rules established by the LSUC.  Finnis’ theory, however, allows 
for ethical decision –making under which lawyers need not discharge their obligations 
solely by adherence to the Rules. As will be established in this chapter, the LSUC’s 
institutional approach (employing both oaths and Rules) to elucidation and enforcement 
of the lawyers’ individual professional obligation fits both the data from the survey and 
Finnis’ theory.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1980). [Finnis, “Natural 
Law”]. 
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In his theory, Finnis moves beyond asking whether every legal rule and legal 
solution is settled by appealing exclusively to positive sources of law such as statute, 
precedent, and custom.  Instead, the natural law project, as he understands it, is to 
determine what the requirements of “practical reasonableness” really are, so as to afford a 
rational basis for the activities of legislators, judges and citizens.146  In other words, his 
theory is not concerned with categorical labeling, but with understanding what is required 
for law to provide reason for action.147   
In this light, Finnis’ legal theory may be applicable as a tool that the legal 
profession can develop to use in answering questions relating to its governance.  More 
specifically, Finnis’ theory is useful in critically assessing whether practical 
reasonableness underpins Canadian legal ethics, as applied by the Canadian legal 
profession’s largest self-governing body, namely, the Law Society of Upper Canada 
(“LSUC”).148   
Finnis’ theory includes a concept of the public interest (as will be discussed 
below).  For the purposes of this thesis, I will look at two ways in which the LSUC 
endeavours to act in the public interest.  Indeed, the LSUC is structured entirely to 
support its public interest mandate. Firstly, the LSUC requires a personal commitment (in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Ibid at 290. 
147 For an alternative approach of applying economic theory to legal ethics, see Randal N. M., Legal Ethics 
2nd Edition (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004). 
 
148 Supra note 8. 
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the form of two oaths) from its members to act in the public interest.  Secondly, on an 
institutional level, it provides the profession with Rules of Professional Conduct (the 
“Rules”).  It will continue by examining how the two oaths (one required and one 
optional) taken together with the LSUC’s Rules fulfill the requirements of Finnis’ 
“practical reasonableness” for the legal profession. 
This chapter will begin by describing how the structure of the LSUC supports its 
public interest mandate and in turn, serves justice and the common good.  It will continue 
by examining how the two oaths and the Rules fulfill the requirements of Finnis’ 
practical reasonableness.  It will then establish that while there is no prescription for 
reconciling any difference between legal and business advice, this this may in fact be 
appropriate to the exercise of ethical decision-making.  The chapter will then conclude by 
introducing a proposed framework with which to navigate the porous boundary between 
legal and business advice and that accords with Finnis’ theory and appears to meet the 
needs of the practicing lawyers surveyed in this study. 
 
(ii)  The Institutional Framework of the Law Society of Upper Canada 
Under the Law Society Act149 (the “Act”) the LSUC is entrusted with, amongst 
other things, licensing Ontario's lawyers and regulating their conduct, competence and 
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capacity.150  Accordingly, the legal profession relies upon the LSUC to regulate Ontario’s 
lawyers to ensure an ethical and competent Bar.   
Due to the fact that the LSUC is governed almost entirely by its lawyer-
members,151 the legal profession is largely self-regulated.152  However, the LSUC does 
have public representation and hence, it is more correctly referred to as self-governing 
with public representation.153   
Participation by the community in the governance of the LSUC sanctions this 
governance style.154  As well, the community’s endorsement involves two other aspects.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150The Law Society of Upper Canada “Protecting the Public” (2013) online: < 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=1063>.  
151Eighty percent of the board of directors governing the LSUC is made up of lawyers, see online: The Law 
Society of Upper Canada “Benchers” (2013) online: < http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=1136 >.  
152Entrusting the regulation of the legal profession, and particularly its disciplinary function, to the 
profession itself affirms that the government poses no threat to the independence of the Bar.  Justice Estey 
in a unanimous 1982 judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, states the following: 
The independence of the Bar from the State in all its pervasive manifestations is one of the 
hallmarks of a free society.  Consequently, regulation of these members of the law profession by 
the State must, so far as by human ingenuity it can be do designed, be free from sate interference, 
in the political sense, with the delivery of services to the individual citizens in the State, 
particularly in fields of public and criminal law.  The public interest in a free society knows no 
area more sensitive than the independence, impartiality and availability to the general public of the 
members of the Bar and through those members, legal advice and services generally. 
See Canada (Attorney General) v. Law Society (British Columbia) (sub nom. Jabour v. Law Society 
(British Columbia), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307.  This passage was quoted with approval and applied by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Pearlman v. Law Society (Manitoba) (1991), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 685 (B.C.S.C.). 
153In fact, the LSUC was one of the first professional bodies in Ontario to officially include public 
representation in its governing body. Online: The Law Society of Upper Canada “Benchers” supra note 
150. 
154H. W. Arthurs, “Counsel, Clients and Community” (1973) 11 Osgoode Hall L. J. 437 at 444. [Arthurs, 
“Counsel, Clients”]. 
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Firstly, it facilitates the monopoly by lawyers over certain kinds of work.  Secondly, it 
allows the LSUC to control the education, admission and discipline of its members.155   
According to the Act, it is the LSUC’s legislated function to ensure that “all 
persons who practice law in Ontario or provide legal services in Ontario meet standards 
of learning, professional competence and professional conduct that are appropriate for the 
legal services they provide”.156  The Act also specifies and sets out that the LSUC must 
have regard to the following five principles as it fulfills its legislated function.  The 
LSUC must: 
 
(i) maintain and advance the cause of justice and the rule of law;  
(ii) act so as to facilitate access to justice for the people of Ontario; 
(iii) protect the public interest;  
(iv) act in a timely, open and efficient manner; and  
(v) have regard to the standards of learning and professional competence and 
conduct for licensees, including the restrictions on who may provide 
particular legal services.157 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Ibid at 444. 
156 See, Law Society Act, supra note 9. Note that the LSUC must also ensure that the standards of learning, 
professional competence and professional conduct for the provision of a particular legal service in a 
particular area of law apply equally to persons who practice law in Ontario and persons who provide legal 
services in Ontario. 
157 Law Society Act, supra note 9. 
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 Perhaps the most obvious ethical principle on this list, which the LSUC espouses 
and applies in carrying out its functions, is its mandate to act in the “public interest”.158  It 
is important to understand that the profession has a legal obligation to act in an ethical 
manner toward the public by virtue of the fact that the government has delegated such a 
duty to the profession through legislation.  
Understandably, the justification for any professional monopoly must be the 
protection of the public against the potential harm of reliance on incompetent service 
rendered by unregulated lay practitioners, and hence, must be in the “public interest”.159  
Such a reading is consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.  For example, 
in Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee,160 the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that “… the self-governing status of the professions and of the legal 
profession in particular, was created in the public interest.”  
The Law Society’s constitutional emphasis on the principles of acting in the 
public interest establishes it as an organization, which meets the threshold requirement 
for following through with activity consistent with Finnis’ “practical reasonableness”. It 
would be unjust if the profession used its profit and power to restrict the availability of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158The Law Society of Upper Canada, “About the Law Society” (2013) online: 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=905>.  
159 H. W. Arthurs, “Counsel, Clients and Community” supra 154. 
160Pearlman, supra note 152 at 887 (as per Iacobucci J.). 
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legal services, or to prevent the working of a competitive market system that encouraged 
the access to such services, more widely and less expensively, than would otherwise be 
possible.161   
 
(iii) How the Law Society of Upper Canada serves Justice and the Common Good 
While protecting and acting in the public interest are requirements of justice, what 
is required in order to protect and act in the public interest must be identifiable by an 
individual in order to guide that individual to appropriate action.  Some argue that any 
action can be in the public interest as long as it benefits some of the population but harms 
none.  However, others argue that an action must benefit every single member of society 
in order to be truly in the public interest.162 
The LSUC does not attempt to relieve the vagueness of the concept of public 
interest by defining it.  However, in Rule 4 of the Rules, there is reference to a distinction 
between public interest and a client’s interest, and also between public interest and a 
lawyer’s interest.163  Interestingly, in this reference, there is no distinction pointing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 See generally, Finnis, “Natural Law” supra note 145 at 172. 
162 See generally, Glendon A. Schubert Jr., “ ’The Public Interest’ in Administrative Decision-Making: 
Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory?” (Jun.1957) The American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 
346.,and Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., “The Theory of ‘The Public Interest’ in Judicial Decision-Making, 
Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Feb., 1958), 1.  For an excellent discussion on publics, 
refer to CBC Ideas: 'The Origins of the Modern Public”, Online: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 
http://www.cbc.ca/ideas/episodes/features/2010/04/26/the-origins-of-the-modern-public/,  
163 See Rule 4.06(2) Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 4. 
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toward a public versus a private interest.  Nor can one assume that a client’s interest is 
private.  Clearly a client’s interest may be either public or private in nature or a mixture 
of the two (e.g., governmental agency, private corporation or a public-private 
partnership) and hence, the LSUC’s use of the term in this context does not guide one in 
understanding its use of the phrase “public interest”. 
Nonetheless, what is implicit in the term “public interest”, as such term is used by 
the LSUC throughout the whole of the Rules, By-laws, and in other publications,164 and 
as judicially considered,165 is that the well-being of each member of the public, together 
with the public as a whole, must be considered and favored at all times by those 
responsible for coordinating the LSUC.  For example, in a report by the LSUC’s Working 
Group on the Lawyers’ Oath of Office, it was stated that the principles by which we 
promise ethical conducts in our Oath of Office, namely, honour, good faith, integrity, 
honesty, fairness, courtesy and civility, are owed, all of them, to everyone – clients, 
tribunals, other lawyers, paralegals and the public.166   
Appropriately then, we can see that the LSUC has sketched an outline of public 
interest as “a set of conditions which enables” the people of Ontario “to attain for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164See generally “Law Society Initiatives”, "Access to Justice” and other publications available on the Law 
Society of Upper Canada’s website:<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/>.  
165 Supra note 160. 
166 See Heather J. Ross, Susan Hare & Alan Silverstein, “Working Group on the Lawyers’ Oath of Office”, 
Report, (2008) at paragraph 36 in “Report to Convocation, Professional Competence Committee”, 
(November 27, 2008), online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convnov08_pdc.pdf>  [Ross, “Working Group 
Paper”]. 
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themselves reasonable objectives” in their community.167  Applied to the legal profession, 
“reasonable objectives” may be understood as those conditions necessary for the 
functioning of an independent and competent Bar, which is one necessary component for 
the functioning of a civil society.  McIntyre J., in Andrews v. Law Society of British 
Columbia,168 said quite clearly that, as officers of the court, lawyers are part of the 
administration of justice:  
  It is incontestable that the legal profession plays a very significant – in fact, a 
fundamentally important – role in the administration of justice, both in the criminal and 
the civil law. I would not attempt to answer the question arising from the judgments 
below as to whether the function of the profession may be termed judicial or quasi-
judicial, but I would observe that in the absence of an independent legal profession, 
skilled and qualified to play its part in the administration of justice and the judicial 
process, the whole legal system would be in a parlous state.  In the performance of what 
may be called his private function, that is, in advising on legal matters and in representing 
clients before the courts and other tribunals, the lawyer is accorded great powers not 
permitted to other professionals. . . . By any standard, these powers and duties are vital to 
the maintenance of order in our society and the due administration of the law in the 
interest of the whole community. 
 
Thus, we can conceptualize the LSUC’s use of the phrase “public interest” as a justified 
meaning of the “common good”.  And, as will be subsequently shown, that justice is in 
its general sense a practical willingness to “favour and foster the common good of one’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167Finnis uses the following sense of common good commonly and it is “a set of conditions which enables 
the members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for 
themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively 
and/or negatively) in a community”, See Finnis, “Natural Law” supra note 145 at 155. 
168 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at pp. 187-88. 
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communities”, and that the theory of justice is “the theory of what is required for that 
common good.”169 
As previously mentioned, the LSUC suggests that the promotion of the 
community’s common good involves the promotion of the good of each member.170  
Skepticism about this assertion has fed argument that acting in the common good may 
limit acting for one’s own good.  St. Thomas Aquinas (“Aquinas”) makes two adequate 
replies to such objection.171  He states that (a) one’s own good cannot be realized apart 
from the common good of one’s family of civitas; and that (b) one is simply a part of a 
household and a state, and it makes no sense to consider one’s own good in isolation 
from the good of those groups; parts cannot do well save in relationship to a relevant 
whole, and a part incongruent with its whole is morally low-grade.172  In other words, 
Aquinas states that both personal and group factors must be considered in this 
deliberation.  Therefore, we see that in promoting the public interest (common good), as 
defined above, a lawyer’s duties arise for his own wellbeing and for the public’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Finnis, “Natural Law”, supra note 145 at 165. 
170Class Discussion, John Finnis to Western Law Students (24 March 2010). 
171 Aquinas is referred to in Finnis’ work and hence, important to discuss in relation thereto. 
172 John Finnis, Aquinas, Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 
121. 
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wellbeing.  Accordingly, we can understand the public interest more fully if it is 
conceived of as having an interdependent relationship with private interests.173 
Interestingly, although the LSUC is obliged to protect the “public interest” in 
carrying out its functions (as legislated in the Act), this principle is otherwise not given 
any preferential treatment in the legislation.  As briefly mentioned above, there is nothing 
in the Act to suggest that facilitating access to justice for the people of Ontario, or any of 
the other legislated functions are any less important than protecting the public interest.  In 
fact, all of the legislated functions may be understood as constituting part of the public 
interest as a whole.   
The LSUC has itself reflected this view through its adoption of a Role Statement, 
which broadly encompasses all these functions.  Such role statement, as adopted by 
Convocation on October 27, 1994, sets out the mandate of the LSUC.  This directive of 
the LSUC is not to act as a trade union or lobby group for its members,174 but to: 
Govern the legal profession in the public interest by,  
• Ensuring that the people of Ontario are served by lawyers who meet high 
standards of learning, competence and professional conduct; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Generally, see Joseph T. Mahoney, Anita M. McGahan, Christos N. Pitelis, “The Interdependence of 
Private and Public Interests” (Nov.-Dec. 2009) Organization Science, Vol. 20, No. 6 1034. 
 
174 Elizabeth Cowie, “A Learned and Honourable Profession” in Professional Responsibility and Practice 
Management Reference Materials for the 48th Bar Admission Course (Toronto, Ont. The Law Society of 
Upper Canada, 2005) at 1. 
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• Upholding the independence, integrity and honour of the legal profession, for 
the purpose of advancing the cause of justice and the rule of law.175 
 
 In 1999, shortly after the role statement was adopted, Justice Abella endorsed it in 
an address to the Law Society Benchers, when she said: 
[t]here are three basic values which merge in a good lawyer: a commitment to 
competence, which is about skills; a commitment to ethics, which is about 
decency; and a commitment to professionalism, which transfuses the public 
interest into the other two values… 
 
The Law Society was exactly accurate when it said in its 1994 Role Statement that the 
legal profession exists in the public interest to advance the cause of justice and the rule of 
law.176 
Therefore, there seem to be two senses of the meaning of “public interest”, as 
such term is used by the government and by the LSUC with reference to its function and 
mandate.  In one sense, the LSUC must protect the public interest when fulfilling its 
functions to ensure that all persons who practice law in Ontario meet standards of 
learning, professional competence and professional conduct that are appropriate for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 “Role Statement of the Law Society of Upper Canada, supra 7. 
176“Professionalism Revisited” (14 October 1999), online: Ontario Courts 
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/court_of_appeal/speeches/professionalism.htm, as cited in David M. 
Tanovich, “Law’s Ambition and the Reconstruction of Role Morality in Canada” (2005) 28 Dal. L. J. 267 
at 287. 
	  	  
	  
94	  
legal services they provide.177  In this way, the LSUC is upholding the “public good”.  
The public good does not comprise all elements of the common good for the people of 
Ontario; rather, it is only that aspect of the common good which involves inter-personal 
dealings as states of affairs and forms of conduct which “(i) involve or relate to persons 
other than the acting person and (ii) would be judged by persons of just character to be 
just, or as the case may be, unjust”.178  This stands in contrast to private and 
individualized good, which is the aspect of the common good, which relates to the acting 
person. 
The second sense of the meaning of “public interest” as such phrase is used by the 
LSUC in its mandate, conforms more fully to the idea that the “common good” is the 
“good of the individuals whose benefit is their right because it is required of those others 
in justice”179 and “justice” is, in its general sense, “always a practical willingness to 
favour and foster the common good of one’s communities”.180  
Using this second sense of the meaning of public interest, this chapter establishes 
what controls the LSUC exerts which require of those in the legal profession that they act 
in the public interest.  What the LSUC should require of its lawyers, according to Finnis, 
depends on what responsibilities the profession has, whether because of the profession’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Law Society Act, supra note: 9 ss. 4.1 & 4.2. 
178 John Finnis, “Universality, Personal and Social Identity, and Law” (2008). Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 05/2008, online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094277> at 10. 
179Finnis, “Natural Law” supra note 145 at. 210. 
180Ibid  at 165. 
	  	  
	  
95	  
own voluntary commitments, or because of receipt of benefits from the public, or by 
virtue of the dependence of the public on the profession.181  This is really the concept of 
“practical reasonableness” as presented by Finnis, namely, “reasonableness in deciding, 
in adopting commitments, in choosing and executing projects, and in general in acting”182 
and more fully defined: 
the integral directiveness of all the practical principles, which directs one not only 
towards one’s own fulfillment, but also to a set of wider wholes of which my 
fulfillment is in each case a constituent part: the common good of human 
fulfillment as such, and the common good of every community, group and 
friendship that can be integrated into human fulfillment.183  
 
(iv)  The Profession’s Responsibility Arising from the Two Oaths 
While it is outside the scope of this chapter to assess all of the profession’s 
responsibilities, two items in particular will be discussed.  The discussion will begin with 
the lawyer’s personal oath of professional allegiance, which arises out of a lawyer’s 
voluntary commitment to uphold ethical principles of the profession.  Thereafter, the 
discussion will turn to the institutional Rules, which arise from the profession’s 
monopoly over legal services and the public’s reliance on the profession to facilitate 
justice.184  Examining the profession’s responsibility arising out of the oath and the Rules 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181Ibid at 175. 
182Ibid at 12. 
183 Supra note 172 at 118. 
184Finnis, “Natural Law”, supra note 145 at 175. 
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illuminates what is required of the members of the profession on a personal level and 
from the profession itself on an institutional level, when acting in the public interest.   
The LSUC is a necessary administrative body that endeavours to keep its 
individual members accountable to upholding a higher standard of professionalism.  
Certainly, it is a matter of justice to the public that the legal profession’s governing body 
requires the oath.  Moreover, many of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities are also 
prescribed in substantive and procedural law.  However, this fact should not detract from 
our thinking about any inherent responsibility that members possess regardless of these 
responsibilities; a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approval or 
disapproval of colleagues.   
As mentioned before, while the LSUC incurs its responsibility from granted 
authority by the province,185 the individual members of the LSUC incur their 
responsibility as members, by way of a promise.186  For example, the required oath187 for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185The Government of Ontario passed legislation granting authority to the Law Society of Upper Canada.  
For example, see the Law Society Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. L8 and Regulations made thereunder.  The Law 
Society Act authorizes the LSUC to educate and admit lawyers to the Ontario Bar.  It also authorizes the 
LSUC to regulate their members’ conduct, competence and capacity.  
186 See By-law 4, s 21(1), made under subsections 62 (0.1) and (1) of the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
L.8, online: The Law Society of Upper Canada < http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/bylaw4.pdf.>.  
187In Ontario, the ceremony of the call to the Bar includes the administration by a judge of a required oath 
and, if the person so wishes, an optional Oath of Allegiance. See By-law 4, s.21, Made under subsections 
62 (0.1) and (1) of the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8 The required oath for a lawyer is as follows: 
“I accept the honour and privilege, duty and responsibility of practicing law as a barrister and 
solicitor in the Province of Ontario. I shall protect and defend the rights and interests of such 
persons as may employ me. I shall conduct all cases faithfully and to the best of my ability. I shall 
neglect no one’s interest and shall faithfully serve and diligently represent the best interests of my 
client. I shall not refuse causes of complaint reasonably founded, nor shall I promote suits upon 
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an applicant for the issuance of a Lawyer’s license in Ontario creates an obligation for the 
applicant to “observe and uphold the ethical standards that govern [the] profession”.188  
Interestingly, this component, being a promise of professional fidelity, is a recent 
addition to the oath.189  Notwithstanding this, for more than 1100 years, since recorded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
frivolous pretences. I shall not pervert the law to favour or prejudice any one, but in all things I 
shall conduct myself honestly and with integrity and civility. I shall seek to ensure access to 
justice and access to legal services. I shall seek to Improve the administration of justice. I shall 
champion the rule of law and safeguard the rights and freedoms of all persons. I shall strictly 
observe and uphold the ethical standards that govern my profession. All this I do swear or affirm 
to observe and perform to the best of my knowledge and ability.” 
Online: The Law Society of Upper Canada, Oaths as approved at May 28, 2009 Convocation 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convmay09_approved_oath.pdf>. 
188By-law 4, s.21, Made under subsections 62 (0.1) and (1) of the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8.  
Note that the current oath is an updated and consolidated version of the previous Barristers and Solicitors 
oaths.  The previous oaths were as follows: LSUC Barristers Oath:  
“You are called to the Degree of Barrister-at-law to protect and defend the rights and interest of 
such citizens as may employ you.  You shall conduct all cases faithfully and to the best of your 
ability.  You shall neglect no one’s interest nor seek to destroy anyone’s property.  You shall not 
be guilty of champerty or maintenance.  You shall not refuse causes of complaint reasonably 
funded, not shall you promote suits upon frivolous pretences.  You shall not pervert the law to 
favour or prejudice anyone, but in all things shall conduct yourself truly and with integrity.  In 
fine, the Queen’s interest and the interest of citizens you shall uphold and maintain according to 
the constitution and law of this Province.  All this you do swear to observe and perform to the best 
of our knowledge and ability.  So help you God.”  
The  LSUC’s Solicitor’s Oath was as follows: 
You also do sincerely promise and swear that you will truly and honestly conduct yourself in the 
practice of a solicitor according to the best of your knowledge and ability.  So help you God. 
See Sophia Sperdakos, “Report to Convocation”, Report (28 May 2009) at 13 online: The Law Society of 
Upper Canada < http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convmay09_pdc.pdf>. 
189This component of the oath was approved in 2009, see generally, online: The Law Society of Upper 
Canada, <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convmay09_pdc.pdf>.  Note that the earliest oaths on record are 
attorney oaths from the early nineteenth century.  Traditionally, the call to the Bar involved three oaths: an 
oath of allegiance, a barrister’s oath and a solicitor’s oath.  In the early 1800s, the three oaths were 
considered as one and later were distinguished from one another.  The oaths changed significantly around 
1833, especially the oath of allegiance due to changing political values.  See “Report to Convocation”, 
Report (20 September 2000) at 10 online: The Law Society of Upper Canada 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convsept00admissions.pdf > [LSUC Report, “Sept. 2000”]. 
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history of the lawyer’s oath of office, there has always been a recurring theme of access 
to timely, affordable justice, and the provision of pro bono services; to ensure that justice 
is available to all regardless of wealth, oppression or poverty. 190 
The oath mostly relies on its moral force for its effectiveness and it is not a legal 
obligation per se.  In one sense, the moral obligation subsists apart from, or in absence of, 
the law.191  Understandably, the oath is uttered signifying the undertaking of an 
obligation, in a context in which no one is inclined to criticize a lawyer for non-
performance.  Indeed, one may view the oath as a formality of the profession.  
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the essence of the oath is to endeavor to 
do what is right without being told what is right.  
The LSUC may in fact criticize a lawyer for non-performance of the oath.  For 
instance, if a lawyer does not uphold the ethical standards of the profession and, for 
example, breaches or induces a breach of the Rules, he may be considered to have 
engaged in “professional misconduct”.192  Perhaps the most serious order that a Hearing 
Panel has the authority to make in this regard is to revoke a member’s membership in the 
Society.193  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190Ross, “Working Group Paper”, supra note 166  at paras. 11-12 and 33. 
191Finnis, “Natural Law” supra note 145 at 320. 
192“Professional misconduct” is conduct in a lawyer’s professional capacity that tends to bring discredit 
upon the legal profession, see Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 4 
Rule 1.02. 
193 This is authorized under section 35 of the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. L.8.  
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Nonetheless, why does this oath bind?  The LSUC provides several 
considerations, which may assist in reviewing the oath, namely: (i) the definition of an 
oath, (ii) its social significance, (iii) its meaning as a professional symbol, and (iv) its 
relevance to the profession’s values.194  
With regard to its social significance, the Law Society considers the oath as a 
public statement confirming the individual’s intention to the community.  This seems to 
be the strongest of the LSUC’s reasons for binding one who takes such an oath.  It 
provides evidence of one’s consent to belong to the community of lawyers called to the 
Bar in Ontario.   
However, from Finnis’ perspective, consent is an unnecessary component to 
create this obligation.  Regardless of our affirming the oath, such duties pre-exist.  On 
Finnis’ view, the law’s authority is grounded in its capacity to coordinate action for the 
common good; if a certain end is to be secured, then certain means are necessary.195   
As a professional symbol, the LSUC considers the oath to bind the individual to 
abide by the values, rules, and conduct of a professional body.  It also finds that the oath 
is an important symbolic differentiation of professions from occupations.  In this 
symbolism, the Law Society intends the oath to capture, in an overarching way, the heart 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194  See LSUC Report, “Sept. 2000”supra note 189 at 10-11. 
195 Finnis, “Natural Law”, supra note 145 at 231-254. See also, Mark C. Murphy, “Surrender of Judgment 
and the Consent Theory of Political Authority”, (1997) 16 Law and Philosophy Rev. at 115 [Murphy, 
“Surrender”]. 
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of the profession’s values.196  In fact, the oath is even considered as a condensed code of 
legal ethics, and in 2008 a submission by the Working Group on the Lawyers’ Oath of 
Office reported that: 
It is of the highest importance that the lawyer’s oath of office should be so framed 
as to indicate the duties and responsibilities of those who take it.  In short, the 
lawyer’s oath should be a condensed code of legal ethics.  This is what it was in 
England and France and in America from the beginning. 
  
We have tried to capture in the new draft Oath of Office, the essential principles of our 
code of ethics, the principles that guide and inform our profession.  And so, the 
overarching principles by which we promise ethical conduct in our Oath of Office are: 
Honour, good faith, integrity, honesty, fairness, courtesy and civility and we owe 
these duties, all of them, to everyone – clients, tribunals, other lawyers, paralegals 
and the public.197  
 
Nevertheless, while these considerations may have been helpful to the LSUC when they 
formulated a new consolidated oath, such considerations do not provide any rationale for 
our understanding of why such a promise is binding, other than the explicit consent 
offered by the oath.  As mentioned above, lawyers have a moral obligation to follow the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196See, LSUC Report, “Sept. 2000” supra note 189 at 10-11. 
197Ross, “Working Group Paper” supra note 166 at ¶ 36. 
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Rules.  But does this obligation have a life apart from the moral obligation to serve the 
common good?198  
Finnis analyzes promissory obligation in terms of the necessity, given certain 
facts, of determinate actions as means to valuable ends.199  He states that a certain set of 
facts provides an opportunity to fulfill the need for individuals to be able to make reliable 
arrangements with each other for the solution of co-ordination problems.  Finnis provides 
a three level explanation on how such set of facts affords this opportunity.  In particular, 
he states that such set of facts comprises: 
(i) the framework fact that a practice exists or can readily be initiated, 
whereby the intentional giving of certain signs200 will be linked by the 
participants with expectations of future performance;  
 
(ii) the particular fact that a given individual has entered into the practice by 
voluntarily and intentionally giving the relevant signs; and  
 
(iii) the fact that if that individual goes along with the practice by trying to 
perform as they promised to perform, even when performance is at the 
expense of some inconvenience, they will thereby not only contribute to 
the well-being of the person for whose benefit their promise was accepted, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198Robert M. Scavone, “Natural Law, Obligation and the Common Good: What Finnis Can’t Tell us” 
(1985) 43 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 90 at 114 [Scavone, “Natural Law”].  
199Finnis, “Natural Law” supra note 145 at 306. 
200The giving of a promise is the making of a sign, a sign which signifies the creation of an obligation and 
which is knowingly made with the intention of being taken as creative of such obligation. See Finnis, 
“Natural Law” supra note 145 at 299. 
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but will also be playing their part in a pattern of life without which many 
of the benefits of community could not in fact be realized.201 
 
Therefore, common good can be realized with reasonable impartiality only if the 
individual performs on his promise; and the necessity is the obligation of his promise.  
The major premise from the requirements of practical reasonableness is that one cannot 
be a person who acts for the common good unless such person goes along with the 
practice by performing the promises one makes.  Secondarily, a person cannot be one 
who is rationally impartial unless he takes the burdens of the practice as well as the 
benefits, and performs on this promise.  So, therefore, lawyers have a promissory 
obligation by virtue of their own oath – and must perform because of the requirements of 
practical reasonableness.202 
Promises are expressions of will.  However, in Finnis’ view, promises ought to be 
kept not because they are expressions of will, but because, as was just explained, 
practical reasonableness and the common good require that they be.203  With regard to 
promissory obligation, Finnis states that the moral obligation to keep one’s promises 
derives, inevitably, from the fact that such a practice “is greatly to the common good”.204  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201Finnis, “Natural Law” supra note 145 at 307. 
202Scavone, “Natural Law” supra note 198 at 113. 
203Finnis “Natural Law” supra note 145. 
204Scavone, “Natural Law” supra note 198 at 112. 
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Recall that his definition of “common good” involves set of conditions which enables the 
members of a community to pursue for themselves reasonable objectives, for the sake of 
which they have reason to collaborate with each other in a community.205 
Although Finnis does not find consent to be a necessary component for creating 
obligation, Aquinas considers the common good to consist of “justice and peace”, where 
peace is not just absence of conflict but a proper ordering within a political community of 
humans that, are by nature, equal – this order is produced in part by consent.  Thus, in 
Aquinas’ account, consent itself helps to constitute the common good, giving even 
greater weight to the importance of our promise of professional fidelity.206 
However, it seems troublesome that lawyers have a duty to contribute to the 
common good by obedience to their promise, if obedience to that promise on a particular 
occasion will not contribute to that common good.207  For example, one component of a 
lawyer’s promise of professional fidelity is to uphold the ethical standards that govern 
their profession and this includes obedience to the Rules.  Rule 4.01 and the associated 
commentary instruct a lawyer to “represent the client resolutely” and “raise fearlessly 
every issue”.  This clearly seems to be a worthy contribution to the common good.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205Finnis “Natural Law” supra note 145 at 155. 
206 Murphy, “Surrender”, supra note 195 at footnote 23. For further discussion of Aquinas’s view, see Mark 
C. Murphy, “Consent, Custom, and the Common Good in Aquinas’s Account of Political Authority” 
(1997) The Review of Politics, 59 at 323. 
207Scavone, “Natural Law” supra note 198 at 111-114.  Thomas Aquinas raises this issue in Summa 
Theologiae, in the fourth article of question 96, online: New Advent 
<http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2096.htm#article4>. 
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However, there may also be instances where following such a directive is actually 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and hence 
exposing him to engaging in “professional misconduct” or “conduct unbecoming a 
barrister and solicitor”.208  The following situation provides an example.   
Consider a set of circumstances where an in-house lawyer is working for a large 
manufacturing company.  There have been several serious accidents involving one of the 
company’s products.  The lawyer has reviewed internal memoranda that make it clear 
that the product is negligently designed.  Also, the lawyer has informed the board of 
directors that the company would have little chance of defeating well-advised legal 
actions.  After much debate, the company decides that it is more economically efficient to 
keep the product on the market, not to recall any products sold, and to pay off legal 
claims as and when they occur.  The lawyer is instructed to engage in vigorous efforts to 
settle such cases as expeditiously, quietly, and cheaply as possible.209  In this case, the 
lawyer’s duty to “represent his client resolutely” appears to be prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.   
Theoretically, the LSUC could attempt to reconcile these two issues, namely, the 
tension between resolute representation and the administration of justice, by looking to 
see whether reference to any of its functions, as set out in the Act, receive priority.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208See Professional Responsibility and Practice Management Reference Materials for the 48th Bar 
Admission Course (Toronto, Ont.: The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005), at 21. 
209 This is an example provided by Allan C. Hutchinson in Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999) at 11 [Hutchinson, “Legal Ethics”] at 174. 
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Interestingly, the Act does not give priority to the principles of “advancing the cause of 
justice and the rule of law” over and above the principle of “protecting the public 
interest”.  What we can be certain of is that a lawyer must not compromise his or her 
professional standards in order to please a client.  The lawyer’s duty to his or her client is 
only a secondary one; the duty to the court and the profession is primary.210  However, 
this is really an academic point.  With the exception of solicitor-client privilege, 
compromising one’s professional standards does not end up assisting a client’s cause at 
all.211212  Consequently, there is not reason to consider which duty is primary.   
While the LSUC has not yet tried to resolve whether “blowing the whistle” on 
clients to stop injury is appropriate, it may soon have an opportunity to do so.  In the 
summer of 2010, an advisory committee of the Federation of Law Societies of Canada 
(“FLSC”) considered relaxing the FLSC’s stringent confidentiality rules in its Model 
Code of Professional Conduct (“Code”) to allow lawyers to blow the whistle on clients 
who may unlawfully inflict “substantial financial injury,” on individuals.213 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 See Hutchinson, “Legal Ethics” supra note 209 at 195. 
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  The reader is reminded that solicitor-client privilege is the privilege of the client.  If a client releases 
privilege, then this may put the lawyer in a position of conflict. 
212 As an example of sharp practice, see the following paper which discusses Schreiber v. Mulroney, 2007 
CanLii 34441 (ON S.C.): Robert Bell & Caroline Abela, “A Lawyer’s Duty to the Court” Proceedings of a 
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The proposal to amend the FLSC’s Model Code of Professional Conduct would, 
using our example, permit the in-house counsel to set aside her duty to keep client 
information confidential if she believes, on reasonable grounds, that “there is an 
imminent risk of… substantial financial injury to an individual caused by an unlawful act 
that is likely to be committed, and disclosure is necessary to prevent the injury”.214 
This proposed draft model rule stresses that any such disclosure would be 
discretionary and not mandatory – and that lawyers could only disclose as much 
confidential information as required to prevent the anticipated financial injury.215 
Understandably, concern has been expressed about this proposal.  In particular, 
Mr. Philip Epstein (a former Bencher of the Law Society of Upper Canada) expressed 
that even if Law Societies were to make disclosure of imminent financial harm purely 
discretionary “this places a lawyer in an impossible position because he might feel a 
moral duty to tell the other side, but have a legal duty to preserve and protect 
privilege.”216 
It is interesting to note that Mr. Epstein’s comments imply that he feels that there 
is a conflict between a moral duty to “tell the other side” and a legal duty to “preserve 
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and protect privilege”.  The advisory committee itself implicitly understands this 
distinction when it explains that: 
 …in “the rare case where a lawyer could prevent very significant financial harm 
by limited disclosure, but was ethically prohibited from doing so, the public interest 
would not be served.  Further, the public’s perception of lawyers and the role we occupy 
in the legal system might suffer if we are seen to rank our own interests above the public 
interest.”217 
 
It will be interesting to follow the FLSC’s proposal, especially in light of a recent 
and criticized decision by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), which held that in-
house counsel have no right to professional legal privilege in cartel investigations carried 
out by the European Commission.218  With regard to in-house counsel, the ECJ observed 
that, when a company “seeks advice from its in-house lawyer, it is not dealing with an 
independent third party, but with one of its employees, notwithstanding any professional 
obligations resulting from enrolment at a Bar or Law Society.”  
Finnis’ theory provides the flexibility that is necessary for such a conflict because 
it enables a countervailing reason to override the moral duty, including the duty not to act 
against the common good by breaking promises.  The countervailing reason, to the same 
extent, could override the duty to obey the law.  In principle, practical reasonableness 
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218Online, The Association of Corporate Counsel website: http://www.acc.com/advocacy/upload/Akzo-
decision-ECJ-14Sept2010.pdf. See also, Katy Dowell, “ECJ deals blow for in-house professional legal 
privilege in Akzo Nobel ruling”, Online: The Lawyer, http://www.thelawyer.com/ecj-deals-blow-for-in-
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could, when faced with a law, refer its rationale back to the requirements of practical 
reasonableness and then proceed to ignore the fact that the duty has been legally 
stipulated.  The logic is as follows: 
 
(i) We need, for the sake of the common good, to be law-abiding;  
 
(ii) But where ø is stipulated by law as obligatory, the only way to be law-abiding is 
to do ø; 
 
(iii) Therefore, we need to do ø, where ø has been legally stipulated to be 
obligatory.219  
 
According to Finnis’ theory (as stated above), the moral obligation to be law-abiding 
has no life apart from the moral obligation to serve the common good, and hence it seems 
that practical reasonableness is always free to regard its own step (i) as defeasible by 
other considerations.220  As an example, in the case of the legal profession, step (i) would 
become “lawyers need, for the sake of the common good, to follow the Rules, 
representing clients resolutely and fearlessly raising every issue, but only insofar as 
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following the Rules actually does serve the common good” (only when this does not 
promote very significant harm to another innocent party).221   
Interpreting Finnis’ theory in this way raises an important consideration when 
applying it to the legal profession.  It may seem to give lawyers wide discretion to 
disregard the ethical rules governing the profession.  Herein lies the value of our 
providing consent to our promise to “observe and uphold the ethical standards that 
govern [the] profession”; it constrains one’s ability to disregard the ethical Rules 
governing our profession (e.g. representing the client resolutely fearlessly raising every 
issue) and it gives greater strength to our moral obligation to act in the public interest (for 
the common good).  In our example, the in-house counsel would, regardless of any 
contemplated change in the Rules, have a primary duty to act in the public interest and 
observe the law of privilege only where doing so would in fact serve the public interest.  
This is because failing to observe and uphold the ethical standards of the profession 
would violate one’s promise and undermine the common good. 
It has been demonstrated that Finnis’ theory facilitates flexibility in ethical 
deliberation.  It has also been established that the governance structure of the LSUC has 
been designed in way that permits flexibility through the oath of professional allegiance 
but it remains to be determined whether or not the LSUC has designed flexibility at the 
institutional level to accord with Finnis’ theory. Accordingly, the next part of this chapter 
describes the significance of the Rules and how they shape legal practice.  
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(v)  The Profession’s Responsibility Arising from the Rules of Professional Conduct 
As discussed above, Finnis’ scheme (set out in steps (i)-(iii) above) is sufficiently 
flexible for application to the legal profession because his theory does not assert an 
independent moral rationale for compliance with the law.  According to Finnis, the moral 
obligation to be law-abiding has no life apart from the moral obligation to serve the 
common good.222   Finnis concedes that “the force of step (i) varies according to the 
circumstances; sometimes the common good may best be preserved or realized by 
deviation from the law”.  While on rare occasions step (i) can “take its place in the 
unrestricted flow of practical reasonableness”, when conceived from within the law, its 
force, its invariant and discretionary reference back to first principles, is sharply 
restricted.223   
Until relatively recently in the history of law as a profession, codes of ethics have 
not been thought necessary to guide a lawyer’s conduct.224  In fact, it was not until 1920 
that the Canadian Bar Association published the Cannon of Ethics.225  In Ontario the 
Professional Conduct Handbook (predecessor to the Rules) was not created until 1964.226  
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Prior to these developments, lawyers would receive guidance on “how to conduct 
[themselves] professionally in particular situations” from information “handed down 
from one generation of lawyers to another through word of mouth, [through] law society 
dealings in disciplinary matters, remarks from the bench and so on.”227   
Originally, lawyers, as members of a self-governing profession, adopted codes of 
professional conduct in order to preserve public confidence in the profession – and in 
turn, in its ability to self-govern.228  Other reasons included educating lawyers on 
communal expectations; to affect behaviour; and to offer a basis for discipline.229 
Codes of ethics constitute a jurisprudential anomaly in that they are quasi-legal 
rather than legal rules.230  This distinction, crucial to any analysis of the effectiveness of 
the codes, is as follows:  a legal rule gives rise to rights and duties and its breach provides 
a basis for redress to one harmed thereby; while a quasi-legal rule defines duties, but its 
breach does not give rise to a remedy.  Therefore, the breach of a rule of ethics provides a 
basis for lawyer discipline, and so has legal efficacy in this sense but a breach does not, 
however, provide a basis for redress to an injured party.231  As well, it is important to note 
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that the purposes of law society discipline proceedings are not to punish offenders and 
exact retribution, but rather to protect the public, maintain high professional standards 
and preserve public confidence in the legal profession.232  
Despite their efficacy as rules of discipline, the Rules are dependent upon their 
moral force for their effectiveness.  Similar to Finnis’ claims for ethical thought and 
morality itself, the Rules have as their shaping object – “the good of being directed in all 
one’s choices and actions by the basic reasons for action, undeflected by sub-rational 
motivations that would, without reason, cut back of the directiveness of each and any of 
those basic reasons”.233   
Nevertheless, what if the codes, in actuality, “cut back on the directiveness of any 
of those reasons”?  There are various examples to suggest that this may be the case.   
For instance, we have already seen one perspective on the purpose for 
implementing the codes, namely, to preserve public confidence.234  Even if historically, 
implementing the codes had less to do with acting in the public’s interest and more to do 
with trying to preserve the profession’s monopoly by facilitating the public’s sanctioning 
of such monopoly, this would not in and of itself, cut back on the directiveness of such 
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reasons.  Drawing such a conclusion would have to rely on the assumption that the virtue 
of the Rules lay in shaping legal practice.  In reality, the virtue of the Rules may have 
little to do with shaping legal practice.  In fact this is what the evidence demonstrates. 
For example, research by Dr. Wilkinson, and this thesis’ research both 
demonstrate that there is a lack of reliance by Ontario lawyers on the Rules for the 
purpose of resolving ethical issues.235  Most lawyers do not even refer to the Rules when 
they contemplate a course of action.236  In addition to scholarly argument that ethical 
rules can impede moral development, there is also evidence suggesting that ethical codes 
actually inhibit ethical deliberation by those lawyers who did refer to them for assistance 
in solving specific problems.237  However, this seems to be part of their very purpose, 
namely constraining certain choices?    
Indeed, constraining certain choices is part of the purpose of the Rules.  But the 
Rules are quasi-legal and hence obedience to the Rules is presumptive, although open to 
adjustment if countervailing considerations outweigh the prima facie duty to obey the 
Rules.  The process of considering countervailing circumstances necessarily involves 
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ethical deliberation.  Arguably then, the quasi-legal nature of the Rules gives one a 
greater opportunity to engage in their own ethical deliberation. 
The Rules’ content stipulates a lawyer’s duties.  However, as “quasi-legal”, the 
Rules do not concurrently rely upon a legal basis for their effectiveness.  There has, to 
date, been a distinct shift in the form and content of the Rules from the protection of the 
interests of lawyers, and the profession in general, toward promotion of the interests of 
clients and the general public.238  However, as a matter of practical reasonableness, 
regardless of an evolution to increasingly “ethical” rules of professional conduct, such an 
emphasis on rule making is insufficient to fulfill the profession’s undertaking to act in the 
public interest.  Undeniably, it is individual lawyers who must fulfil their promise to 
observe and uphold the ethical principles that the Rules attempt to illuminate for the 
profession. 
The defeasible nature of our obligation to obey the Rules may help us to 
understand that there is a distinction between our primary duty to obey the Rules and our 
actual obligation to uphold and observe the ethical principles that govern the profession.  
For example, while the in-house lawyer in our example has a duty to further the interests 
of her client (see Rule 4.01) and is permitted by law to do so, she does not have an actual 
obligation to further the interests of the client if doing so violates some more important 
duty, such as the duty to not pervert the administration of justice.  But then we must 
understand why the LSUC retains the unqualified primary duty to obey the Rules in the 
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first place.  Why is our duty to obey the Rules not qualified so that it eliminates this 
conflict? 
For example, an unqualified duty to obey the rules of ethics may induce a 
paradoxical effect.239  In our example, it would provide the lawyer with a basis for 
rationalizing her conduct regarding her duty of loyalty to the client (which is strongly 
evident within the private practice population).  Such duty of loyalty to a client gives the 
lawyer not only a powerful tool for rationalizing her conduct; it also gives her a 
protective shield against accusation of wrongdoing with regard to innocent third 
parties.240  Courts and colleagues would find it very difficult to pierce the protective 
shield of loyalty with meaningful sanctions or criticisms unless the lawyer’s conduct was 
illegal and the transparency of the rationalization was evident.  Moreover, in reality, a 
lawyer’s duty is not absolute; there may be circumstances in which injustice is so 
obvious, and the result mandated by the functioning of a “legal” set of Rules so 
intolerable, that no person could, in good conscience, believe that exhibiting fidelity to 
the Rules is the right thing to do, all things considered.   
There will be disagreement about which cases fall into the “intolerable” category, 
but the important thing for the purposes of this chapter is to realize that by virtue of our 
oath and a “quasi-legal” set of Rules, the obligation to follow the Rules is substantial.  
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However, these two factors also allow a reasonable lawyer to make an exception when 
adherence to the Rules would be obviously intolerable to any reasonably practical person.  
Regardless of whether the Rules are intended to be regulatory or hortatory and 
regardless of what the evidence suggests about how lawyers are referring to the codes, it 
seems that the public will benefit if the LSUC keeps the duty to follow the Rules quasi-
legal (rather than legal-rules).  Otherwise, when a lawyer faces a conflict between ethical 
and Rule derived priorities in practice and it is apparent that the Rule does not lead to a 
result that is in the public interest, then in following the Rule, the lawyer would find 
himself acting unprofessionally.  
On the other hand, it is evident from the data gathered in the survey and cases in 
this research that lawyers struggle to understand their proper role in the giving of 
business advice.  This research will therefore conclude with a proposed model to assist 
lawyers in this endeavour.  
 
(vi)  Proposed Framework 
We have seen that the LSUC must act for the common good, and we have 
examined both personal and institutional commitments from the legal profession.  As a 
personal commitment, the oath has, throughout its history, been premised on access to 
timely, affordable justice and the provision of pro bono services to ensure that justice is 
available to all.  Lawyers concurrently have a defeasible obligation to obey the Rules.  
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The result is that each and every member of our profession must prioritize their personal 
undertaking to effect justice and reflect its character in all they do. 
This may become difficult using our example above.  The corporate executive’s 
defined role is to maximize shareholder value or profit.  The lawyer’s role is to provide 
access to the law.  Each has a defined role morality.241  From a role morality perspective, 
absent the oath of professional fidelity, it would be unnecessary for the lawyer to be 
concerned beyond the requirements of her role.  However, within their role morality, 
lawyers are required to have concern for the ethical principles that govern their 
profession and are therefore not able to repress their own acting in a practically 
reasonable way to protect the public interest.  
Admittedly, using Finnis’ approach, obedience to the Rules is defeasible 
regardless of whether they are qualified as legal or quasi-legal.  However, by making the 
Rules quasi-legal rather than legal, the LSUC has facilitated a standard that reduces the 
weight necessary for a lawyer to reasonably override her obligation to follow the Rules in 
order to uphold the ethical principles that govern the legal profession.  
It may now be concluded that lawyers do, in fact, understand that they provide 
business advice to their clients.  This thesis determined what knowledge lawyers rely on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Alice Woolley et. al, “Philosophical Legal Ethics: Ethics, Morals and Jurisprudence”, (2010) online: 
Social Science Research Network, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646558 >. 
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when providing their clients with business advice and discovered whether lawyers 
consider themselves qualified to provide business advice.  
All of this has been considered this in light of a changing legal environment 
wherein the role of lawyers in business enterprises has been evolving.  However, we have 
not yet actually defined this apparent porous boundary, nor have we developed a 
methodology for making any kind of distinction.  This chapter will provide some 
definitions and then outline a unique 3-step method for making such a distinction. 
The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines “advice” as “guidance or 
recommendations concerning prudent future action, typically given by someone regarded 
as knowledgeable or authoritative”. The original sense of the word “advice” was a ‘way 
of looking at something, judgment’, and ‘an opinion given’.  Similarly, today it is not just 
conveying information – it is a recommendation – something given, and it does not have 
to be acted upon or ‘taken’. 
The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines “legal” as (adjective) – of, based 
on, or concerned with the law.  And “law” as (noun) – the system of rules which a 
particular country or community recognizes as regulating the actions of its members and 
which it may enforce by the imposition of penalties.   
Therefore “legal advice” can be defined as guidance or recommendations 
concerning prudent future action based on the system of rules which a particular country 
or community recognizes as regulating the actions of its members and which it may 
enforce by the imposition of penalties.  
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“Business” may be thought of  “trade and all activity relating to it, esp. considered 
in terms of volume or profitability; commercial transactions, engagements, and 
undertakings regarded collectively; an instance of this. Hence more generally: the world 
of trade and commerce.”242 
Therefore, “business advice” can be defined as guidance or recommendations 
concerning prudent future action pertaining to a person, partnership, or corporation 
engaged in commerce, manufacturing, or a service; revenue-seeking enterprise or 
concern. 
The diagram below (Figure 8) illustrates the concepts of legal advice and business 
advice to which the literature review prior to the conduct of this research seemed to point.  
Most of the case law discussed in chapters 1 and 2 conceives of business advice and legal 
advice as two distinct categories.   
Figure 8: Initial Conception of Advice Categorization 
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242Oxford English Dictionary (OED Third Edition, March 2012) online: 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/25229?redirectedFrom=business#eid>. 
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However, the data gathered in this research establishes that in some cases, 
business advice is legal advice.  In other words, it is the same thing.  However, in some 
cases, business advice is non-legal advice.  The reality is that it is not the boundary 
between legal and business advice that is important but that business advice given by 
lawyers lies along a continuum including both legal and non-legal.  There is certainly 
legal advice, which is non-business advice, but there is also, on the evidence provided by 
this survey of Ontario lawyers, non-legal advice that is not business advice.  Figure 9 is 
more accurate than Figure 8 in terms of the conduct of lawyers because lawyers, when 
asked about non-legal activities (question 3) did not identify business advice in this 
category although given the opportunity to do so.  This is despite the fact that the case-
law and rules, as mentioned above, tend to point to the distinction between non-legal and 
legal as key.   
It may be seen in Figure 9 that legal advice is conceived of as separate from 
business advice and non-legal advice is separate from both legal advice and business 
advice.  However, business advice is itself seen as having two possible components, 
business advice, which is more closely allied with legal advice and business advice that is 
more closely allied with non-legal advice.  However, business advice whether legally 
allied or non-legally allied is seen as mutually exclusive with pure legal advice. 
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Figure 9: Proposed Conception of Advice Continuum 
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In other words, finding out what is business advice is not necessarily important.  
However, finding out what is legal business advice and non-legal business advice should 
be the focus of any inquiry. 
It is suggested that the diagram above is the best way to approach where the 
boundary lies, namely, that business advice may be legal or non-legal in nature.   
The following framework is a suggested guideline to ensure the practical 
application of this research.  It provides a three-step outline for distinguishing between 
business and legal advice.  According to the Rules, lawyers have a responsibility to 
identify business advice that is non-legal in nature.  This rule would be redundant if it 
were not the case that business advice can be entirely legal thus the rule itself is more 
consistent with the diagram shown above in Figure 9 than the conception which seems to 
be prevalent in previous literature, that is shown in Figure 8.      
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Step one of the framework suggests that there are two principal questions that a 
lawyer may – and perhaps, should – ask when advising clients.  Can the proposed course 
of action be legally accomplished, and should this proposed course of action be avoided 
because the lawyer believes it to be unprofitable?  When a lawyer becomes involved with 
the “should we” questions, this tends toward giving business advice.243  The second step 
in the framework is to determine whether the advice being given is aimed at assisting a 
business in its revenue making function.  The greater the probability that the advice is 
aimed at a revenue-generating function and the “should we” questions, the greater the 
likelihood that the advice is business advice.244 The final step assists in determining 
whether business advice may be privileged or not. For this determination, one must look 
to the nature of the relationship, the subject matter of the advice and the circumstances in 
which is it sought and rendered. These steps are outlined below. 
 
Step 1:  In step 1 there are two principal questions that a lawyer may – and perhaps, 
should – ask when advising clients.  
• Can the proposed course of action be legally accomplished? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 See D. C. Reid, The Barrister as a Banker, The Banking Role of Corporate Counsel (Boston, Financial 
Publishing Company, 1972) at p.98.  
244 See H.B. Woodman, “What the Executive Expects of the Corporate Law Department,” (1958) 13 Bus. 
Law. 461. Note that all organizations by necessity must be revenue generating – whether they are for-profit 
or not-for-profit because otherwise, they will not be sustainable.  Indeed, not-for-profit organizations must 
with greater force generate revenue because they may not carry debt.  Accordingly, this test is for 
sustainable businesses and applies with equal force to profit seeking or not-for-profit organizations.  
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• Should this proposed course of action be avoided?   
When a lawyer becomes involved with the “should we” questions, this tends 
toward giving business advice.245   
Step 2:  Determine whether the advice being given is aimed at assisting a corporation in 
its revenue generating function.  
It is suggested that the greater the probability that the advice is aimed at: a) a 
revenue-making function and, b) the “should we” questions, then the greater the 
likelihood that the advice is business advice.246   
However, all we have done so far is to identify whether it is business advice or 
pure legal advice.  If it is pure legal advice, it is privileged.  But, if it is business advice, 
we still don’t know whether it is privileged or not.  
Step 3: Look to:   
• the nature of the relationship, 
• the subject matter of the advice, and 
• the circumstances in which it is sought and rendered (obligations of lawyers). 
Recall the previous discussion about the duty to provide investment advice in 
Brumer v. Gunn.247  If we run through the first bullet, there was a solicitor-client 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 See D. C. Reid, The Barrister as a Banker, supra note 243 at p.98.  
246 See H.B. Woodman, “What the Executive Expects” supra note 244. 
247 Brumer v. Gunn, supra note 73. 
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relationship.  Under the second bullet, the subject matter was not legal, namely investing 
in loans.  Under the third bullet, the circumstances were such that the lawyer may have 
been obligated to provide the advice.  
It is put forth that non-legal advice in certain circumstances should be privileged.  
Primarily because the lawyer has a duty to provide it and also to protect the relationship 
that he has with the client.  
This account of the ethics of the legal profession gives lawyers a greater 
opportunity to engage in practical reasoning by connecting the lawyer to the values 
underlying the norms pertinent to her situation and hence to the larger conception of law.  
It reconciles a lawyer’s promise of professional fidelity with his or her own individual 
creativity and public service, personal ambition and social need.248 
 
Further Research 
There are a number of questions that emerge from this analysis, which would be excellent 
topics for further study.  For example:  
 Is “legal business advice” protected by privilege?  
 If lawyers are obliged to provide “non-legal business advice”, should it be 
protected by privilege? 
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 In addition to obligations under the Rules, are lawyers required to point out that 
their advice is not protected by privilege? 
 This study found that corporate policies are referred to as ethical more than are 
the LSUC Rules. This finding warrants further investigation. 
Another possibility of study, which emerges from this research, is to design an instrument 
which would force respondents to choose between given categories using the data 
presented above in chapter 4, where the respondent generated data did not provide 
categorizable data with large enough numbers to allow us to perform a chi-square and 
thus generalize the data.  It is remarkable that so many respondents chose to provide 
answers to these open-ended questions and the fact that they did lends optimism to the 
possibility the generalizable data could be obtained using these respondents ideas as a 
starting point in another study.  
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Appendix A: Rules of Professional Conduct - Rule 2 
Rule 2  
Relationship to Clients  
 
2.01 COMPETENCE 
 
Definitions 
2.01 (1) In this rule 
 
 “competent lawyer” means a lawyer who has and applies relevant skills, attributes, and 
values in a manner appropriate to each matter undertaken on behalf of a client including 
 
(a) knowing general legal principles and procedures and the substantive law and 
procedure for the areas of law in which the lawyer practises, 
 
[Amended – June 2007] 
 
(b) investigating facts, identifying issues, ascertaining client objectives, considering 
possible options, and developing and advising the client on appropriate courses of 
action, 
(c) implementing, as each matter requires, the chosen course of action through the 
application of appropriate skills, including, 
 
(i) legal research, 
(ii) analysis, 
(iii) application of the law to the relevant facts, 
(iv) writing and drafting, 
(v) negotiation, 
(vi) alternative dispute resolution, 
(vii) advocacy, and 
(viii) problem-solving ability, 
 
(d) (communicating at all stages of a matter in a timely and effective manner that is 
appropriate to the age and abilities of the client, 
 
(e) performing all functions conscientiously, diligently, and in a timely and cost- 
effective manner, 
 
(f) applying intellectual capacity, judgment, and deliberation to all functions, 
	  	  
	  
(g) complying in letter and in spirit with the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
(h) recognizing limitations in one’s ability to handle a matter or some aspect of it, and 
taking steps accordingly to ensure the client is appropriately served, 
(i)  managing one’s practice effectively,  
(j)  pursuing appropriate professional development to maintain and enhance legal 
knowledge and skills, and 
(k) adapting to changing professional requirements, standards, techniques, and practices. 
 
  
Commentary 
As a member of the legal profession, a lawyer is held out as knowledgeable, skilled, and 
capable in the practice of law. Accordingly, the client is entitled to assume that the 
lawyer has the ability and capacity to deal adequately with legal matters to be undertaken 
on the client’s behalf. 
A lawyer who is incompetent does the client a disservice, brings discredit to the 
profession, and may bring the administration of justice into disrepute. In addition to 
damaging the lawyer’s own reputation and practice, incompetence may also injure the 
lawyer’s partners and associates. 
A lawyer should not undertake a matter without honestly feeling competent to handle it 
or being able to become competent without undue delay, risk, or expense to the client. 
This is an ethical consideration and is to be distinguished from the standard of care that a 
tribunal would invoke for purposes of determining negligence. 
A lawyer must be alert to recognize any lack of competence for a particular task and the 
disservice that would be done to the client by undertaking that task. If consulted in such 
circumstances, the lawyer should either decline to act or obtain the client’s instructions to 
retain, consult, or collaborate with a lawyer who is competent for that task. The lawyer 
may also recognize that competence for a particular task may require seeking advice from 
or collaborating with experts in scientific, accounting, or other non-legal fields, and, in 
	  	  
	  
such a situation, the lawyer should not hesitate to seek the client’s instructions to consult 
experts. 
A lawyer should clearly specify the facts, circumstances, and assumptions upon which an 
opinion is based. Unless the client instructs otherwise, the lawyer should investigate the 
matter in sufficient detail to be able to express an opinion rather than mere comments 
with many qualifications. If the circumstances do not justify an exhaustive investigation 
with consequent expense to the client, the lawyer should so state in the opinion. 
When a lawyer considers whether to provide legal services under a limited scope retainer, 
he or she must carefully assess in each case whether, under the circumstances, it is 
possible to render those services in a competent manner. An agreement to provide such 
services does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation. As 
in any retainer, the lawyer should consider the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. The lawyer should ensure that 
the client is fully informed of the nature of the arrangement and clearly understands the 
scope and limitation of the services. See also subrule 2.02(6.1) to 6.3). 
[Amended – September 2011] 
A lawyer should be wary of bold and confident assurances to the client, especially when 
the lawyer’s employment may depend upon advising in a particular way. 
In addition to opinions on legal questions, the lawyer may be asked for or may be 
expected to give advice on non-legal matters such as the business, policy, or social 
implications involved in the question or the course the client should choose. In many 
instances the lawyer’s experience will be such that the lawyer’s views on non-legal 
matters will be of real benefit to the client. The lawyer who expresses views on such 
matters should, where and to the extent necessary, point out any lack of experience 
or other qualification in the particular field and should clearly distinguish legal 
advice from other advice. 
In a multi-discipline practice, a lawyer must be particularly alert to ensure that the client 
understands that he or she is receiving legal advice from a lawyer supplemented by the 
services of a non-licensee. If other advice or service is sought from non-licensee 
members of the firm, it must be sought and provided independently of and outside the 
scope of the retainer for the provision of legal services and will be subject to the 
constraints outlined in the relevant by-laws and regulations governing multi-discipline 
practices. In particular, the lawyer should ensure that such advice or service of non-
	  	  
	  
licensees is provided from a location separate from the premises of the multi-discipline 
practice. 
Whenever it becomes apparent that the client has misunderstood or misconceived the 
position or what is really involved, the lawyer should explain, as well as advise, so that 
the client is apprised of the true position and fairly advised about the real issues or 
questions involved. 
The requirement of conscientious, diligent, and efficient service means that a lawyer 
should make every effort to provide service to the client. If the lawyer can reasonably 
foresee undue delay in providing advice or services, the client should be so informed. 
[Amended - June 2009] 
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Appendix D: Quantitative Summary 
 
Question 3(a): Private Practice  
A total of 26 lawyers responded to this question by stating that they perform non-legal 
duties for their law firm. The specific answers provided by the respondents in many 
instances overlapped, and as such the answers were divided into major categories, 
wherein each respondent fell into one or more categories based on the specific answer 
provided. In particular, 28 respondents indicated that they worked on committees, 
administrative and business matters, which comprised 50% of the activities performed. 
11 respondents indicated that they worked on marketing matters, comprising 19% of the 
activities performed. 10 respondents indicated performing recruitment and HR duties, 
comprising 18% of the activities performed. 6 people indicated educating and mentoring 
of junior lawyers, which comprised 11% of the non-legal duties, and lastly, 1 person 
indicated pro bono activity, comprising 2% of the total non-legal duties performed by the 
respondents.  
It should be noted that some of the respondents failed to indicate whether they provided 
or did not provide any non-legal duties for their law firms, but nonetheless, provided a 
specific answer to question 3(a). This accounts for why 28 people indicated that they 
performed committee and other administrative duties, when there were only 26 people 
who responded yes to the question. 
 
Question 3(a): In-house Counsel  
A total of 22 people responded to this question by providing specific answers. The 
specific answers provided by the respondents in many instances overlapped, and as such 
	  	  
	  
the answers were divided into major categories, wherein each respondent fell into one or 
more categories based on the specific answer provided. In particular, 17 people 
responded to the question by stating work on committee, administrative, and business 
matters, comprising 50% of the activities non-legal duties performed. 1 respondent 
indicate marketing, comprising 3% of the total activities. 3 people indicated recruitment 
and HR, totaling 9% of the activities. 3 people stated educating and mentoring junior 
lawyers, comprising 9% of the total activities. 1 person indicated communication, and 1 
person indicated providing notarization services, each of which comprised 3% of the 
activities performed. And finally, 5 people indicated risk management and compliance, 
totaling 14% of the total activities.  
 
Question 4(c) 
Private Practice  
A total of 38 people responded to this question by providing a specific response to 
the inquiry concerning the circumstances under which they provide their clients with 
business advice. The responses provided by the respondents in many instances 
overlapped, and as such the answers were divided into major categories, wherein each 
respondent fell into one or more categories based on the specific answer provided. As can 
be seen in the chart, 2 of the respondents indicated that they provide business advice as 
appropriate, comprising 4% of the total circumstances. 5 respondents indicated that they 
provide advice on business negotiations, comprising 11% of the total circumstances. 27 
of the respondents indicated that they provide business advice when their client requires 
help with assessing options as to how to proceed when business and legal advice is 
combined, comprising 56% of the total circumstances. 7 people indicated in the context 
of specific transaction, totaling 15% of the circumstances. 1 lawyer indicated in the 
context of settlement proceedings, comprising 2% of the total circumstances. 2 
respondents answered to provide added value to the client, which accounted for 4%. 1 
	  	  
	  
person indicated insurance, risk and security advice, comprising 2% of the total. And 
finally, 3 individuals responded by indicating as part of information for forming legal 
advice, comprising 6% of the total circumstances under which lawyers provide their 
clients with business advice.  
In-house Counsel 
 32 people responded to this question by providing specific answers. The specific 
answers provided by the respondents in many instances overlapped, and as such the 
answers were divided into major categories, wherein each respondent fell into one or 
more categories based on the specific answer provided. 2 people responded by stating as 
appropriate, comprising 5% of the circumstances under which the Lawyers provide their 
clients with business advice. 2 people responded by stating on business negotiation, 
comprising 5% of the circumstances. 18 respondents indicated they provide business 
advice when client requires help with assessing options as to how to proceed (legal and 
business combined), totaling 42% of the circumstances. 4 people indicated in the context 
of specific transaction, totaling 9%. 8 respondents indicated as member of management 
team they participate in business discussions, comprising 19% of the circumstances. 1 
respondent indicated team cross functional meeting, and 1 respondent indicated to 
provide added value, each of which comprised 2% of the total circumstances. Insurance, 
risk and security was indicated by 4 respondents, totaling 9% of the circumstances. 
Lastly, 3 people indicated information for forming legal advice as circumstances under 
which they provide their client with business advice, totaling 7% of such circumstances. 
Question 4(d) 
Private Practice 
A total of 41 respondents answered this question. Out of the 41 respondents 100% 
of them stated that they rely on the experience gained within law practice when providing 
their clients with business advice.  Fifteen (15) out of 41 stated through self-study, 
comprising 36.58% of the total respondents. Eight (8) people, comprising 19.51% of the 
	  	  
	  
respondents indicated that they do so based on continuing education. Twenty-five (25) 
people pointed to experience outside of law practice, comprising 60.97% of the 
respondents. Six (6) people stated reliance on third party, comprising 14.63% of the 
respondents, and finally, 12 people pointed to formal training as the source based on 
which they provide their clients with business advice, which comprised 29.26% of the 
respondents.  
In-house Counsel 
A total of 34 people responded to this question.  Thirty-three (33) people pointed 
to experience gained within law practice as the source based on which they give their 
clients business advice, comprising 97.05% of those who responded to the question. 
Eighteen (18) people, comprising 52.94% of the respondents, stated that self-study was 
the source. Nineteen (19) respondents, totaling 55.88%, stated that continuing education 
was their basis.  Nineteen (19) people, stated experience gained outside of law practice, 
totaling 55.88% of the total respondents, was their source of business advice. 11 people, 
comprising 32.35% of the total respondents, pointed to reliance on a third party as the 
source of their business advice. And finally, 14 people, comprising 41.17% of those 
respondents, pointed to formal training as the basis on which they provide their clients 
with business advice 
Question 4(f) 
Private Practice 
A total of 40 people responded to this question, 37 of which responded “no” to the 
question, representing 92.5% of the respondents. The three (3) people who responded 
“yes”, accounted for 7.5% of the respondents.  
In-house Counsel 
	  	  
	  
A total of 32 people responded to this question. Fifteen (15) people responded by 
indicating “yes”, comprising 46.87% of the respondents. Seventeen (17) people indicated 
“no”, comprising 53.12% of the total respondents. 
Question 4(g) 
Private Practice 
Consistent with question 4(f) above, a total of 3 people responded to this question 
by providing specific answers. One (1) respondent indicated general awareness of 
requirements pursuant to CBA and LSUC codes of conduct, 1 person indicated that they 
were always guided by client’s interest, and 1 respondent indicated honest dealing and 
honest advice, each of which accounted for 33.33% of the total number of people that 
provided an answer to this question.  
In-house Counsel 
A total of 13 people responded to this question. Some of the respondents provided 
more than one source of ethics code, which were then divided into separate category.  
One (1) person pointed to general awareness of requirements of CBA & LSUC codes of 
conduct, comprising 7.69% of the total answers provided. Eight (8) people, comprising 
61.53% of the total answers provided, pointed to corporate policies as the source of the 
ethics code they follow. Six (6) respondents stated that they are always guided by client’s 
interest, comprising 46.15% of the answers provided.  
Question 5 
Private Practice 
A total of 40 people responded to this question. 11 respondents, totaling 27.5% of 
those who responded to this question stated that yes; there is a duty to provide business 
advice to their clients. 27 people, comprising 67.5% of the respondents indicated that 
	  	  
	  
there is no duty. And finally, 2 people, comprising 5% of those who responded to this 
question had no opinion on the matter.  
In-house Counsel 
A total of 36 people responded to this question. 11 people indicated yes, 
comprising 30.55% of the total respondents. 21 people indicated no, comprising 58.33% 
of the total respondents. And finally, 4 people, comprising 11.11% of the total 
respondents, answered no opinion to the question.  
Question 5(a)(i)  
Five private practice respondents felt that a duty arose because of a contract with 
their client. Four private practice respondents felt that a duty arose because of a contract 
with their client. 
Question 5(a)(ii)(a) 
Five (5) lawyers in private practice responded to question 5(a)(ii)(a) and provided 
4 answers.  One (1) person indicated the obligation is found in the LSUC rules. Two (2) 
people indicated general obligation to help your client and work in their best interest.  
One (1) person indicated that being a good legal advisor requires taking into account 
business implications.  One (1) person did not provide a specific answer. The details are 
provided below. 
• LSUC rules of profession conduct, specifically duty to provide best advice.  
• As a trusted advisor, providing just the legal advice without its relevance and 
implications to the business context would not be providing the level service 
most clients expect.  
• General duty to act in clients best interest 
• Your obligation to help your client generally  
	  	  
	  
 Four (4) in-house counsel lawyers responded to question 5(a)(ii)(a).  Two (2) 
persons stated that it is a general obligation to help your client and work in their best 
interest. One (1) person indicated that being a good legal advisor requires taking into 
account business implications. And, one (1) indicated that as it’s a professional obligation 
as the in-house counsel. The details are provided below.  
• Proper legal advice must include advice that is prudent and in client’s best 
interest  
• Comes from obligation to provide best advice for clients  
• Effective legal advice absent business advice is of limited benefit to a client. 
Whether it is “business” or “legal” advice is less important than effective 
advising for client. Client does not care whether we call it business or legal 
advice. Whether it is business or legal advice may impact rules of conduct and 
professional duties and privilege. 
• Professional obligation as the in-house counsel.  
Question 7 
Private Practice 
A total of 25 people responded to this question. The specific answers provided by 
the respondents in many instances overlapped, and as such the answers were divided into 
major categories, wherein each respondent fell into one or more categories based on the 
specific answer provided. 18 of the respondents indicated that their clients send them 
business correspondence in order to keep them informed and solicit their counsel, which 
comprised 56% of such circumstances. 4 respondents indicated as background for a 
future project which might arise, comprising 12% of such instances. Another 4 
individuals indicated to get educated about the client, comprising 13% of the total 
instances. 4 respondents pointed to background information for a transaction or issue, 
comprising 13% of such instances. 1 person indicated making sure expectations are in 
	  	  
	  
sync, and 1 person indicated second opinion, both of which comprise 3% of the total 
instances under which business correspondence is sent to the lawyers.  
In-house Counsel 
A total of 23 people responded to this question. The specific answers provided by 
the respondents in many instances overlapped, and as such the answers were divided into 
major categories, wherein each respondent fell into one or more categories based on the 
specific answer provided. 15 people indicated their clients send them business 
correspondence in order to keep them informed and solicit their counsel, comprising 43% 
of the reasons provided. 5 respondents indicated as background information for a future 
project that might arise, comprising 14% of the total reasons. 1 person indicated to get 
educated about the client, comprising 3%. 3 respondents indicated as background 
information for a transaction or issue, totaling 8% of the reasons provided. Second 
opinion, and being the legal counsel, were each individually indicated by 1 person, each 
totaling 3% of the reasons. 2 people indicated that they were part of the management 
team, totaling 6% of the reasons provided. Liability management was indicated by 4 of 
the respondents, comprising 11% of the total. 2 people pointed to suggesting tactical 
approach as the reason why their clients sent them business correspondence, totaling 6% 
of the total. And finally, 1 person stated to create privilege as being the reason, 
comprising 3% of the total.  
 
Question 9 
Private Practice 
25 individuals responded to this question. The specific answers provided by the 
respondents in many instances overlapped, and as such the answers were divided into 
major categories, wherein each respondent fell into one or more categories based on the 
specific answer provided. Eight (8) of the respondents stated that it was not appropriate 
	  	  
	  
for them to provide business advice to their client, which comprised 25% of the total 
reasons. 14 people stated that they were not in a position to give advice due to lack of 
knowledge, comprising 44% of such reasons. Two (2) people stated risk assessment 
based on client, comprising 6% of the reasons provided. One (1) person indicated that 
they refrained where it would affect their legal judgment or create conflict, totaling 3% of 
the reasons. 3 people indicated that when client did not want it as when they refrained to 
provide business advice, comprising 9% of the reasons. And finally, 4 people indicated 
that they refrained from giving such advice because it was the client’s decision to make, 
comprising 13% of total reasons provided by the respondents.  
In-house Counsel 
A total of 22 people responded to this sub question by providing specific answers. 
The specific answers provided by the respondents in many instances overlapped, and as 
such the answers were divided into major categories, wherein each respondent fell into 
one or more categories based on the specific answer provided.  In particular, 5 
respondents indicated that they refrained to provide business advice to their clients 
because it was not appropriate, which comprised 17% of the total reasons provided. 17 
people indicated that they were not in a position to give advice due to lack of knowledge, 
comprising 57% of the reasons provided. 2 people indicated risk assessment based on 
client as their reason, totaling 7%. 1 person indicated where it could affect their legal 
judgment or create conflict, 1 indicated not required, 1 indicated client did not want it, 
and 1 indicated where no adverse legal consequences were apparent, as their reasons for 
not providing their clients with business advice, each individually totaling 3% of the total 
reasons. And finally, 2 people indicated it was their decision to make as their reason, 
comprising 7% of the total. 
Question 11 
Private Practice 
	  	  
	  
In question 11, fifteen (15) private practice respondents indicated that murky lines 
do exist, and 22 respondents indicated that murky lines do not exist. Of the 15 people 
who indicated that murky lines exist, 9 of them responded to question 11(a) by stating 
that Legal issues have business implications therefore not easy to distinguish. Of the 22 
people who indicated that murky lines do not exist, 6 indicated that it is clear what is a 
legal issue and what is not, 1 indicated that Limit business advice to recommendations 
relating to available business options, and 5 indicated that Legal analysis is one input in 
deciding a course of action.  
A total of 16 respondents did not provide an answer to questions 11(b) and 11(c).  
In-house Counsel 
Twenty-one (21) in-house counsel respondents indicated that murky lines do 
exist, while, 8 respondents indicated that murky lines do not exist.  
Some of the respondents did not provide an answer to question 11, but did 
provide an answer in the specific 11(a) or 11(b) section. Of those who responded to 
11(a), twenty-six (26) people who indicated that murky lines do exist stated that Legal 
issues have business implications therefore not easy to distinguish. One (1) person stated 
that as the employee of the organization and its legal counsel lines get blurred.  
In answer to question 11(b), 2 people indicated that it is clear what is a legal issue 
and what is not, and 4 people provided answers that best fit the category of those who 
believed that Legal analysis is one input in deciding a course of action.  
A total of 10 people failed to provide a specific response to the questions.  
  
	  	  
	  
Appendix E: Summary of Questions Most Answered 
Question 4(c) had the most number of respondents with 70 people. Below you can find 
the break down for all expanded questions.  
Question 3(a) = Total respondents 48 
 A total of 48 respondents provided specific answers to this question. 22 of them 
were provided by those who filled out the blue surveys (corporate counsel), and 26 of 
them were provided by those who responded to the white surveys (private counsel).  
Question 4(c) = Total respondents 70 
 A total of 70 people responded to this question by providing specific answers. 32 
of them were provided by those who responded to the blue surveys, and 38 of them were 
provided by those who responded to the white surveys.  
Question 7(a) = Total respondents 48 
 A total of 48 people responded to this question. 23 of them were those who 
responded to the blue surveys, and 25 of them were those who responded to the white 
surveys.  
Question 9(a) = Total respondents 47 
 A total of 47 people provided answers to this question. 22 of them were those who 
responded to the blue surveys. 25 of them were those who responded to the white 
surveys.  
Question 11(a) = Total respondents 32 
 A total of 32 people responded to this question, 9 of which were those who 
responded to the white surveys, and 23 of which were those who responded to the blue 
surveys.  
Question 11(b) = Total respondents 18 
  A total of 18 people responded to this question.  6 of them were those who 
responded to the blue surveys, and 12 of them were those who provided answers to the 
white surveys. 
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